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Abstract of Thesis
The financial crisis of 2008 was characterized by disruptions in credit markets and
sharp rises in unemployment. This dissertation contributes to our understanding of
the interaction of credit and labour markets. The first chapter studies the impact of
credit frictions on labour demand given that the labour market is frictionless. The
second chapter introduces search and matching to the labour market and studies the
interaction between the two types of frictions. The third chapter investigates wages
determined by surplus sharing between firms and workers in the environment with
search and credit frictions.
In Chapter 1 I develop a partial equilibrium model where homogenous firms face
credit frictions in the form of collateral constraints. As a result of these frictions firms’
demand for capital depends on their net worth. Firms hire workers in the frictionless
labour market with an upward-sloping labour supply curve. The model generates
a large, although short-lived, response of capital demand to a negative productivity
shock. Through complementarity of factors of production the decrease in capital
affects employment and wages. As a result of a one standard deviation negative
productivity shock employment falls by around 0.65% and wages fall by around
1.3% as opposed to 0.11% and 0.25%, respectively, in the first-best economy. I also
find that changing capital and labour supply elasticities have different implications
in the presence of credit frictions compared to the first-best economy.
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Chapter 2 extends Chapter 1 by introducing search frictions to the labour side
of the economy. On one hand, when buying capital firms have to deal with the
credit frictions outlined above. On the other hand, when hiring workers they face
standard search and matching frictions. I then study the interaction of the two
frictions. Credit frictions affect labour demand through complementarity of capital
and labour. Search frictions influence capital demand through wages: When wages
are only partially flexible, the decline in firms’ net worth is larger, and the resulting
fall in capital is larger as well. I also find that the response of wages to wage flexibility
is non-monotonic in the presence of credit frictions. This could potentially explain
why we see wages fall little in data.
In Chapter 3 I use a model of search and credit frictions developed in Chapter
2 to investigate wages determined by surplus sharing in such environment. I find
that credit frictions affect the surplus-sharing mechanism in such a way that they
increase the worker’s effective bargaining power. That is, the firm and the worker
negotiate wages as if the worker had a higher bargaining power. This is due to the
fact that under search and credit frictions the firm values workers more that under
pure search frictions because output they produce increases the firm’s net worth.
However, the effective worker’s bargaining power appears to be endogenous to the
firm’s capital holdings and the number of employees. The more capital the firm has,
the less the firm is financially constrained, and the lower wages its workers are able
to extract. Due to endogeneity of the worker’s effective bargaining power, the effect
of credit frictions on wages is ambiguous.
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Lay Summary
The financial crisis of 2008 was characterized by disruptions in credit markets and
sharp rises in unemployment. This dissertation contributes to our understanding of
the interaction of credit and labour markets. It studies the impact of limited credit
availability on firms’ labour demand policies.
In Chapter 1 I develop a model where firms face credit frictions in the form of
collateral constraints. So a firm cannot borrow more than the value of its capital.
As a result of these frictions firms’ demand for capital depends on their net worth.
On the other hand, in order to produce output firms also need to hire workers. I
assume that wages adjust to equate labour supply to labour demand. The model
generates a large, although short-lived, response of capital demand to a negative
productivity shock. Because firms need both capital and labour to produce output
the decrease in capital affects employment and wages. As a result of a one standard
deviation negative productivity shock employment falls by around 0.65% and wages
fall by around 1.3% as opposed to 0.11% and 0.25%, respectively, in the first-best
economy. I also find that changing capital and labour supply elasticities have different
implications in the presence of credit frictions compared to the first-best economy.
Chapter 2 extends Chapter 1 by considering the fact that it takes time for firms
and workers to meet and that posting vacancies is costly for firms. As a result of
these labour market frictions, known as search and matching frictions, some work-
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ers become unemployed. In the capital market firms have to deal with the credit
frictions outlined above. I then study the interaction of the two frictions. Credit
frictions affect labour demand because capital and labour complement each other
in the production process. Search frictions influence capital demand through wages:
When wages are only partially flexible, the decline in firms’ net worth is larger, and
the resulting fall in capital is larger as well. I also find that the response of wages
to wage flexibility is non-monotonic in the presence of credit frictions. This could
potentially explain why we see wages fall little in data.
In Chapter 3 I use a model of search and credit frictions developed in Chapter
2 to investigate wages determined by surplus sharing between firms and workers in
such environment. I find that credit frictions affect the surplus-sharing mechanism
in such a way that strengthens the worker’s bargaining position. That is, the firm
and the worker negotiate wages as if the worker had a higher bargaining power. This
is due to the fact that under search and credit frictions the firm values workers more
that under pure search frictions because output they produce increases the firm’s
net worth. However, the effective worker’s bargaining power appears to depend on
the firm’s capital holdings and the number of employees. The more capital the firm
has, the less the firm is financially constrained, and the lower wages its workers are
able to extract. Due to this fact, the effect of credit frictions on wages is ambiguous.
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Chapter 1. Capital market
frictions and labour market
fluctuations
The paper studies the impact of credit frictions on labour demand given that labour
market is frictionless. I develop a partial equilibrium model where homogeneous firms
face credit frictions in the form of collateral constraints. As a result of these fric-
tions firms’ demand for capital depends on their net worth. Firms hire workers in
the frictionless labour market with an upward-sloping labour supply curve. The model
generates a large, although short-lived, response of capital demand to a negative pro-
ductivity shock. Through complementarity of factors of production the decrease in
capital affects employment and wages. As a result of a one standard deviation neg-
ative productivity shock employment falls by around 0.65% and wages fall by around
1.3% as opposed to 0.11% and 0.25%, respectively, in the first-best economy. I also
find that changing capital and labour supply elasticities have very different implica-
tions in the presence of credit frictions compared to the first-best economy.
1
1.1 Introduction
The amplitude and propagation of unemployment fluctuations remains one of the
key puzzles in the macroeconomics of labour markets. Shimer (2005) showed that
the standard search and matching model is unable to generate the observed business-
cycle fluctuations in unemployment and vacancies. Data from the financial crisis of
2008 shows an initial sharp increase in unemployment followed by a slow recovery
process. Given that the availability of credit declined significantly during the Great
recession it is natural to wonder if there is a link between the two markets and
whether it could perhaps bring us closer to solving the puzzle.
(a) USA unemployment rate, % (b) USA firms’ borrowing, bln $
Figure 1.1.1: USA unemployment rate and firms’ borrowing. Unemployment data is taken from
OECD website. Borrowing data is taken from the Federal Reserve Z.1 Financial accounts of the
United States table, flow series ’Nonfinancial business, debt securities and loans, liability’.
One channel through which credit availability may influence the labour market is
the complementarity of labour and capital as factors of production. The idea is that
as the credit market tightens, firms invest less, their capital holdings decline and so
does their need for workers.
The ultimate goal of this research is to build a model with both credit and search
frictions in which firms are heterogeneous in their credit limits and labour market
decisions. This would provide a framework that can, in the future, address firm-level
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data on capital and labour decisions. This paper is the first step towards reaching
this goal.
I develop a partial equilibrium model where homogenous firms face credit frictions
in the form of collateral constraints as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). In contrast to
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) firms also use labour as a factor of production. For now,
I keep the labour market frictionless with an upward-sloping labour supply curve.
Thus, there is no deep sense of unemployment in the model. I show that as a result
of collateral constraints firms’ capital demand depends on their net worth. The link
between those creates a large, although short-lived, decline of capital demand to a
negative productivity shock. Through complementarity of factors of production the
decrease in capital affects employment and wages.
I find that as a result of one standard deviation negative productivity shock
employment falls by around 0.65% and wages fall by around 1.3% as opposed to
0.11% and 0.25%, respectively, in the first-best economy. The responses raise hope
that the model with included search frictions would have the potential to explain
large unemployment fluctuations.
I proceed by discussing the implications of one of the assumptions of the model,
the minimum dividend requirement. I conclude that the results are not greatly
affected by this assumption.
I also explore how capital and labour supply elasticities affect impulse responses
of the model variables. It turns out that the effects under credit frictions are quite
different from the ones in the first-best case. In the first-best economy, the lower
is the elasticity of capital supply, the more the price of capital falls as a result of
a negative shock, and the less is the fall in the firm’s capital. On the contrary, in
the economy with credit frictions the lower is the elasticity of capital supply, the
more the price of capital falls as a result of a negative shock, but the more the firm’s
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capital falls. The reason for this is that under credit frictions when the price of
capital decreases, its net worth decreases as well, which leads to a fall in capital
demand.
The effect of different labour supply elasticities in the economy with credit fric-
tions is also different from the effects in the first-best economy. In the first-best
economy, the higher is the labour supply elasticity, the less wages decrease as a re-
sult of a negative shock, and the more the firm’s number of workers decreases. In
the economy with credit frictions, the higher is the labour supply elasticity, the more
the number of workers decreases, but the decrease in wages is larger. This is because
when the labour supply is more elastic, employment decreases relatively more as
a result of a shock, which leads to a greater decline in the net worth and capital
demand. Thus, the marginal product of labour also declines by more, and so do
wages.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 discusses the related
literature. Theoretical model is explained in Section 1.3. Section 1.4 presents the
calibration strategy and quantitative results. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Literature review
Two major approaches to modeling credit frictions are presented in Bernanke et al.
(1999) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). In Bernanke et al. (1999) credit frictions
are based on the asymmetry of information between borrowers and lenders, and a
related costly state verification problem. In their paper the realized return of a
project is only known to borrowers, whereas lenders must pay an auditing cost to
observe it. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), on the other hand, choose to work with the
limited enforcement problem where lenders cannot force borrowers to repay their
4
debt unless it is secured by a collateral.
Both papers arrive at the similar conclusion that a firm’s demand for capital
positively depends on its net worth. So when a negative shock hits the economy,
the firm’s net worth goes down and so does its capital demand. This is the first
ingredient of the so-called ”financial accelerator”. The second ingredient is asset
price variability. When the firm’s demand for capital goes down the price of capital
goes down as well. As a result, the firm’s net worth and, consequently, its capital
demand fall even more. Thus, the movement of the asset price contributes to the
volatility of the firm’s capital demand.
The main advantage of using Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) approach to model
credit frictions is its tractability. The firm’s problem and the collateral constraint
lead to quite intuitive and tractable results. The key addition of this paper, and the
rest of the thesis, to Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) is the exploration of the spillover
effect of capital frictions to the labour market.
There are several papers that also investigate how credit frictions affect the labour
market outcomes. Here I mention only the ones mostly related to this paper, with
frictions in the capital market and frictionless labour market. In the following Chap-
ters I discuss papers that model economies with frictions in both capital and labour
markets.
Jermann and Quadrini (2012) consider a model with both debt and equity fi-
nancing, as opposed to only-debt financing in my work, and study the impact of
shocks that affect directly the financial sector of the economy. In their model a neg-
ative shock tightens the credit constraint, which is constructed in such a way that
leaves two options for a firm, either to increase its equity, which is costly, or to lay
off workers. They find that financial shocks contribute significantly to the observed
dynamics of the labour market. The difference between their work and mine is I
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concentrate on the link between the firm’s capital and its net worth which Jermann
and Quadrini (2012) do not consider. Also, the authors abstract from the powerful
feedback from asset prices to credit constraints which is present in my model. Fi-
nally, I consider how productivity shocks affect the economy, whereas Jermann and
Quadrini (2012) concentrate on financial shocks which affect the tightness of credit
constraints.
There is also a paper by Buera et al. (2015) where heterogeneous firms face fric-
tions in both credit and labour markets. But the labour market friction is different
from the standard search and matching literature. In their model, unemployed work-
ers can enter the centralized competitive hiring market only with a given probability.
The authors model credit frictions by imposing a constraint on a firm’s capital rental,
so the firm cannot rent more capital than a certain fraction of its wealth. They find
that a credit crunch causes a sharp decline in output and a protracted increase in
unemployment. Unlike in my model, there is no asset prices feedback to credit con-
straints in Buera et al. (2015). The authors also simulate the credit crunch as a
sudden tightening of credit constraints, as opposed to a decline in productivity in
this paper.
In the following section I describe my model in which firms face collateral con-
straints in the spirit of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) but they also need to hire workers
in order to produce output. I start with a general setup and then move on to ana-
lyzing each of the three markets of the economy: credit, capital and labour.
1.3 Model
The model is based on the basic model in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Consider
a discrete-time infinite-horizon economy populated by a mass of firms, normalized
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to 1, a representative household and capital suppliers. The household consists of
a continuum of workers that supply their labour to firms, which are owned by the
household.
A typical firm produces output y, taken as the numeraire, using capital k−1,
installed last period, and workers l:1
y = AF (k−1, l), Fk > 0, Fkk < 0, Fl > 0, Fll < 0, Fkl > 0. (1.1)
A represents the aggregate productivity level, the evolution of which is known by
firms and households in present and future periods. There are no idiosyncratic shocks
so all firms are identical in their decisions.
There are markets for capital and labour where firms buy capital at price q and
hire workers at wage rate w. Each period capital depreciates at rate δ.2
There is also a credit market in the economy which operates in the following
way. Each period a firm may sign a one-period debt contract with the household
which allows it to borrow b units of output at gross interest rate R. Next period it
will need to repay Rb. Following Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) I assume the following
contracting problem. When the debt contract is signed in the current period the
firm cannot pre-commit to produce its output in the following period. Also, its
production requires the firm’s specific technology, meaning that once capital has
been installed only this firm can convert it into output. Hence, the firm may use the
possibility of withdrawing itself from production as a credible threat to negotiate a
smaller repayment of its loans. Creditors protect themselves by requiring the firm
1Hereafter, I denote last period values with a subscript, −1, future values with a prime,
′,
derivatives with respect to a particular variable or variables with their corresponding subscripts.
2I assume for convenience that the capital depreciates after the next period’s production is
complete (y = AF (k−1, l)) rather than at the beginning of next period (y = AF ((1− δ)k−1, l)).
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to use its capital as borrowing collateral:
Rb ≤ q′(1− δ)k. (1.2)
The credit constraint (1.2) says that the firm’s debt repayment must not exceed next
period’s market value of depreciated capital. So, in the event of default, creditors
have the opportunity to sell the defaulted borrower’s capital and cover the debt
repayment. Note that in the representative agent framework default does not occur
in equilibrium.
The firm also faces a profit constraint. The profit constraint is needed to restrict
the firm to borrow from the household only via debt contacts described above. The
profit constraint is crucial for the financial accelerator effect because it links the
firm’s capital demand to its net worth. The credit constraint, on the other hand,
brings the asset prices feedback into the model. This will be discussed in more detail
further.
The profit constraint works in the following way. Each period after producing
output and paying the wage bill the firm has to pay a fixed share c̄ of its gross profit
to the household as minimum dividend:
c̄(AF (k−1, l))− wl). (1.3)
Here I appeal to ”seniority” rules on how the firm’s revenue is distributed. In general,
firms pay their workers before their shareholders, and capital investment takes places
after the dividend has been paid.3
3Loosely speaking, the ”seniority” rule in accounting works in the following way. Net income is
equal to revenue minus costs (including wages), interest payments, taxes etc. Net income is then
split between dividend payments and retained earnings (earnings that the firm keeps to itself),
which could be spent on the firm’s expansion, investment, paying debts etc.
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The minimum dividend requirement ensures that in steady-state equilibrium the
firm is financially constrained which greatly simplifies solving the model. I investigate
how the value of c̄ changes the model results in Section 1.4.3.
The profit constraint dictates that at the end of each day the firm’s flow profit
must be either positive or zero:
(1− c̄)(AF (k−1, l)− wl) + b−Rb−1 − q(k − (1− δ)k−1) ≥ 0. (1.4)
In the former case the firm distributes the remaining profit as extra dividends to
the household. The profit constraint, thus, ensures that debt contracts are the firm’s
only source of borrowing. In other words, the firm cannot borrow from the household
as its shareholder.
The timing of the model is as follows. At the beginning of a period the firm
hires workers and produces output, then it pays wages and distributes the minimum
dividend to the household. After that, the firm’s capital depreciates, the firm repays
its debt held from the last period, borrows from the household and invests into
capital. At the end of the period, if it has some output left, it distributes it as extra
dividends to the household.
The objective of each firm is to maximize its respective discounted value of life-
time profits by choosing capital, debt and the number of workers:
Π(k−1, b−1, A) = max
k,b,l
{
AF (k−1, l)−wl+b−Rb−1−q(k−(1−δ)k−1)+βΠ(k, b, l, A′)
}
(1.5)
subject to the credit constraint
Rb ≤ q′(1− δ)k (1.6)
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and the profit constraint
(1− c̄)(AF (k−1, l)− wl) + b−Rb−1 − q(k − (1− δ)k−1) ≥ 0. (1.7)
In the following sections I discuss supply and demand sides of the three markets:
credit market, capital market and labour market, where the demand sides follow
from the firm’s problem (1.5)-(1.7).
1.3.1 Credit market
In credit market equilibrium, the interest rate R∗ is determined by supply and de-
mand for debt. Consider an equilibrium in which firms borrow.
Consider first the supply of debt. I assume that the household’s discount factor is
equal to βh, so they are willing to lend as long as the interest rate is greater or equal
to the inverse of their discount factor 1
βh
. I do not explicitly model the behaviour
of the household. Instead, I make this fairly standard assumption about it. This
comes at the expense of not having a general equilibrium model. But it does come
with the benefit of analytical tractability.




I make the following assumption about the values of firms’ discount factor β and
βh.
Assumption 1. 0 < β < βh < 1.
Assumption 1 states that the household is more patient than firms. This ensures
that in and around steady-state equilibrium firms borrow.
Consider now the demand for debt. The first-order condition of the problem
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(1.5)-(1.7) with respect to b states:
1− βR− λR + µ− µ′R = 0, (1.8)
where λ denotes the Lagrange multiplier on the credit constraint and µ denotes the




(1 + µ). (1.9)
Provided that βR < 1 the representative firm always borrows up to the maximum in
steady state. Thus, the aggregate demand curve is a horizontal line which intersects
the R-axis at 1
β
but is bounded by the credit constraint (1.2) on the B-axis. Credit
market equilibrium is depicted in Figure 1.3.1.
Figure 1.3.1: Credit market equilibrium.
Implicit in Figure 1.3.1 is an assumption that the size of operations in the credit
market is limited by firms’ credit constraint rather than by the household’s assets.
This ensures that the credit constraint binds in equilibrium. In other words, the
household is always willing to lend at least q
′(1−δ)k
R









The condition βR∗ < 1 is therefore satisfied, and the firm does borrow up to the
credit limit in steady-state equilibrium.
Consider now the behaviour of firms out of steady state. The Lagrange multiplier








Thus, the firm also borrows up to the maximum given that µ′ is not too much greater
than µ.4 The intuition for this result is as follows. Imagine the firm experiences an
unexpected negative productivity shock today that is known to revert back up in
the future. Then, the firm’s profit constraint binds today more than it will bind in
the future, so µ > µ′. Hence, the firm would prefer to borrow up to the maximum
today and repay later.
Now imagine that the firm experiences an unexpected positive shock today that
is known to revert back down in the future. In this case the firm will not necessarily
want to borrow up to the maximum today because in the future, when it will have
to repay the debt, its productivity will be lower and the profit constraint will bind
more, µ′ > µ. Depending on how much more the profit constraint will bind in the
future compared to today the firm will make its decision whether to borrow up to
the maximum today or not.
If the firm is going to be significantly more profit-constrained in the future, it






, which means that the credit constraint binds if µ
and µ′ are sufficiently close. I check that this holds in simulations.
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may prefer to borrow less than the credit limit today because it does not want to
repay a large debt in the future. In fact, it may well choose to become a creditor
and lend some output to get an extra return in the future. If, on the other hand, the
firm is going to be just slightly more profit-constrained in the future, then it may
still decide to borrow up to the maximum because of the attractive interest rate.
In the simulations that follow in Section 1.4, I check that that the value of λ is
positive, and thus the credit constraint binds.
Aggregating over firms and assuming that they do always borrow up to the max-





As it will be shown later, the economy with the credit constraint only is not
much different from the first-best economy. However, when combined with the profit
constraint, the two induce a substantive financial accelerator effect whereby the
responses of the economy to shocks become substantially different from those of
the first-best one. I now turn to discussion of the profit constraint and the capital
market.
1.3.2 Capital market
Capital suppliers face an increasing marginal cost S(K), where K denotes their




ν , ν > 0. (1.13)
On the other hand, suppliers’ marginal benefit from selling a unit of capital is the
difference in its price today and its price tomorrow corrected for depreciation. Hence,
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when optimizing capital suppliers follow the rule of the marginal cost being equal to
the marginal benefit:




The parameter ν thus reflects the steady-state elasticity of capital supply. The chosen
functional form of S(k) allows me to pick the value for ν directly from House and
Shapiro (2008) estimation results.
From the optimization rule (1.14) it follows that the price of capital varies not
only with today’s values of capital but also with the future values as well.5 As a
result, two multiplier effects emerge, so-called static and dynamic multiplier effects,
explained in more detail further, which allow for large fluctuations in capital given
a relatively small productivity shock.
Consider now the demand for capital. The first-order condition of the firm’s
problem (1.5)-(1.7) with respect to capital reads:
− q + λ(1− δ)q′ − µq + βA′Fk(k, l′) + β(1− δ)q′ + β(1 + µ′(1− c̄))A′Fk(k, l′)+
+ β(1 + µ′)(1− δ)q′ = 0. (1.15)
Using equation (1.11) to substitute in for λ gives:
(1 + µ′(1− c̄))βA′Fk(k, l′) = (1 + µ)
[





Expression (1.16) is different from the no-frictions rule, βA′Fk(k, l
′) = q−β(1− δ)q′,
in three ways. First, the marginal benefit of having an extra unit of capital is larger












S(Kt+s). So the price of capital takes into account all, today and future, values of
capital.
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capital today increases future production which affects the firm’s profit directly but
also relaxes tomorrow’s profit constraint. Second, the marginal cost of buying an
extra unit of capital is higher because buying another unit tightens today’s profit
constraint, (1 + µ)uc ≥ uc, where uc stands for the user cost of capital. Finally, the
user cost (q− (1−δ)q
′
R
) reflects that capital is not only used in the production process








< q − β(1− δ)q′ by Assumption 1).
Since this optimality condition holds for the representative firm, aggregate de-
mand for capital is:
(1 + µ′(1− c̄))βA′FK(K,L′) = (1 + µ)
[





In equilibrium, the price of capital ensures that the capital demand (1.17) is equal
to the capital supply (1.14).
Two special cases shed light on the importance of the profit constraint and the
minimum dividend requirement. The first is when the profit constraint is always-
binding and the second is when the profit constraint is never-binding.
Imagine that the value of c̄ is high enough so that the profit constraint binds for
all sequences of productivity shocks:
(1− c̄)(AF (k−1, l)− wl) + b−Rb−1 − q(k − (1− δ)k−1) = 0 ∀A. (1.18)
Using the credit constraint (1.2) to substitute in for b and solving for capital gives







[(1− c̄)(AF (k−1, l)− wl) + q(1− δ)k−1 −Rb−1]. (1.19)
The firm’s demand for capital depends negatively on the user cost of capital and
positively on its net worth, which comprises the gross profit after the minimum
dividend payment and the market value of installed capital less the loan repayment.
In what follows, I assume that the production function exhibits constant returns
to scale. The assumption of constant returns may be relaxed, but it simplifies ag-
gregation. Thus, if the profit constraint of the representative firm always binds,





[(1− c̄)(AF (K−1, L)− wL) + q(1− δ)K−1 −RB−1]. (1.20)
This case is the one considered by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). In a model that
abstracts from labour demand they show that if the economy is hit by a negative
productivity shock, then the decrease of capital would be substantial due to the
presence of static and dynamic multiplier effects, to which I now turn.
The static multiplier can be described in the following way. Holding the future
constant, a decrease in productivity lowers the capital demand by decreasing firms’
marginal product of capital. As K goes down the price of capital goes down as well,
since its user cost decreases to clear the market: K
1
ν = q − (1− δ) q′
R
. The decrease
in q results in a further decrease in the net worth and, therefore, in an even deeper
decline in capital.
The dynamic multiplier effect occurs because less capital today means lower net
worth tomorrow. This decreases tomorrow’s capital demand and its price q′. Hence,
the amount of credit that firms can get today against a unit of capital goes down,
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firms can borrow less, and so they can invest less. Hence, the decline in today’s
capital becomes larger.
Note that the dynamic multiplier effect takes place because of the nature of the
credit constraint. The fact that firms borrow against the future market value of
capital allows for the feedback effect from future to present. Without the credit




[(1− c̄)(AF (K−1, L)− wl) + q(1− δ)K−1 +B −RB−1]. (1.21)
So the profit constraint brings the capital-net worth relationship into the model,
whereas the considered form of the credit constraint creates the future-to-present
feedback in asset prices.
Imagine now that the profit constraint never binds, µ = 0 for all periods. The
smaller is the minimum dividend, the more likely this is. If there is no minimum
dividend requirement, c̄ = 0, in steady state the profit constraint would not bind,
since if it did it would mean that the firm is constantly experiencing net losses and
would be better off not operating at all. Aggregate capital demand is then
βA′FK(K,L




which is only different from the frictionless outcome due to the adjusted user cost
implied by the credit constraint. In some sense, this is the ”first-best” capital allo-
cation in this economy. Firms are credit-constrained in terms of borrowing at rate R
but they can borrow unlimited amount from the shareholders at a higher rate of 1
β
.
The impact of a shock here is minimal because it only affects the marginal product
of capital. I compare this ”first-best” case with the case where the profit constraint
binds in my simulations.
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I now turn to describing the labour market.
1.3.3 Labour market
Consider the supply of labour. I assume that the representative household consists of
a continuum of members. The members differ according to their disutilities of work,
ui, the distribution of which is known and is described by the cumulative distribution
function F (u).
Each of the members supplies her unit of labour inelastically as long as the wage
payment is greater than ui. Thus, aggregating over the workers I obtain the following
labour supply curve:
LS = F (w). (1.23)
I assume that F (w) is isoelastic and is equal to F (w) = L̄wε, where L̄ is a constant
and ε is the Frisch elasticity of the labour supply (the elasticity of the quantity
supplied to wage keeping the marginal utility of wealth constant). One could think
of L̄ as of the size of the labour force; when ε is equal to zero LS = L̄.
Substituting in for F (w) gives:
LS = L̄wε. (1.24)
The isoelastic form allows to calibrate the value of the elasticity by taking it directly
from the literature.
Labour demand of an individual firm is given by the first-order condition of the
firm’s problem (1.5)-(1.7) with respect to labour:
(1 + µ(1− c̄))(AFl(k−1, l)− w) = 0. (1.25)
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Since Lagrange multipliers can only either be positive or zero, the first term in
brackets is always positive. This means that the profit constraint has no direct effect
on the labour demand. The firm chooses its number of workers according to the
standard rule that the marginal product of labour should be equal to the marginal
cost:
AFl(k−1, l) = w. (1.26)
Aggregating over the firms gives:
AFL(K−1, L) = w. (1.27)
Instead, this simple rule implies that credit frictions affect the labour demand indi-
rectly through a complementarity channel. Since capital and labour are complements
in the production process, a negative productivity shock that lowers the firm’s cap-
ital demand implies a decrease in the marginal product of labour. Provided that
ε > 0 this results in decreases in both employment and wages as they fall to equate
supply to demand.
This concludes the description of the model. I now turn to its quantitative
applications.
1.3.4 Steady-state equilibrium
In the simulations that follow, for a range of positive c̄, I have been able to find only
one steady-state equilibrium in which both the credit constraint and the profit con-
straint bind. The equilibrium is described by six equations which jointly determine
steady-state values of capital, employment, debt, the price of capital, wages and the
interest rate, {K∗, L∗, B∗, q∗, w∗, R∗}.
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3. Firms invest as much as possible into capital. As a result, firms’ capital demand
is determined by their net worth:
K∗ =






Note that firms’ net worth in steady state is their revenue after wage and
minimum dividend payments. If compared to the dynamic capital demand
equation (1.21), the terms q∗(1− δ)K∗ and R∗B∗ are missing in (1.30) because
in steady state the value of land is exactly offset by required debt repayment.
4. Labour demand is derived by equating the marginal product of labour to wage:
AFL(K
∗, L∗) = w∗. (1.31)
















I calibrate the model using one week as time period. The productivity shock evolves
according to the following standard autoregressive process in logarithms:
lnAt = ρ lnAt−1 + ξt, ξ ∼ N(0, σ2). (1.34)
Following King and Rebelo (1999) I assume quarterly values of ρ and σ to be 0.979
and 0.0072, respectively, which implies a weekly autoregressive parameter of 0.998
and a weekly standard deviation of 0.002.6
When calibrating the discount factors I follow Iacoviello (2005) and set βh =
0.999 and β = 0.998 which corresponds to his quarterly values of 0.99 and 0.98,






is twice as large
as the rate of return faced by the household.
I assume a conventional capital share of output equal to 1/3. Capital depreciates
at a standard rate of 10% a year, that is 0.19% a week.
I experiment with several values of c̄, the minimum dividend fraction of gross
profit. For the baseline calibration I choose a value which is supported by dividend
6Given the shock process, E[lnAt+m| lnAt] = ρmE[lnAt]. Thus, ρweek = ρ1/13quarter. Also, since
V ar(lnAt) =
σ2








data. According to the Factset report,7 more than 350 companies included into
S&P500 index have been paying dividends every year for the past 15 years. At the
same time, dividend payments averaged from 25% of net income in 2011 to almost
55% in 2008. I set the value of c̄ to 30% which is a median dividend payout ratio
(a ratio of dividend payment to net income) across S&P500 firms over the last 10
years.
House and Shapiro (2008) obtain estimates of investment supply elasticities in
the interval between 6 and 14. Note that there is no difference between investment
and capital supply elasticities in steady state. Thus, I set ν to be equal to 10, which
is a midpoint of their estimates.
In the baseline calibration I normalize the size of the labour force L̄ to be equal
to one.8 Chetty et al. (2011) report the intensive margin Frisch supply elasticity to
be around to 0.54 and the extensive margin Frisch supply elasticity to be around
0.28. I set ε to be equal to 0.5, but I also experiment with its value and report the
findings further in the text.
Table 3.6.1 provides a summary of the parameter values discussed above. In what
follows, I discuss impulse responses of the main variables to a productivity shock.
1.4.2 Impulse responses: baseline vs ”first-best”
In this section I analyze the responses of main model variables to an unexpected
persistent negative productivity shock. Firms do not expect the shock to hit the
economy but once it does they know that it is going to last. I take the size of the
shock to be equal to one standard deviation. Figure 1.4.1 presents the shock.
Figure 1.4.2 presents the responses of variables to the shock and compares them
7http://www.factset.com/websitefiles/PDFs/dividend/dividend_9.28.15
8 I check how L̄ affects simulations, and confirm that, while it does change steady-state values,
it has no effect on impulse responses.
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Table 1.4.1: Calibrated model parameters
Description Parameter Value
Firm’s discount factor β 0.998
Households’ discount factor βh 0.999
Capital share α 1/3
Capital depreciation δ 0.0019
Minimum dividend c̄ 0.3
Capital supply elasticity ν 10
Labour force L̄ 1
Labour supply elasticity ε 0.5
Autoregressive parameter ρ 0.998
Volatility σ 0.002
Figure 1.4.1: One standard deviation negative productivity shock.
to those under ”first-best” economy.
When firms do not face the profit constraint, so the variables reach their ”first-
best” values, variables respond to the shock by declining by roughly the same order
of magnitude as the shock. Capital, labour, capital price and wage all decline by
0.2%-0.5% from their steady-state values when productivity declines by 0.2%. Note
that employment and wages decrease more one period after the shock rather than
directly on impact. This is due to the nature of the production function, the fact that
capital takes one period to install in particular. On impact, the marginal product
of labour falls because of the decline in aggregate productivity. One period after, it
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Figure 1.4.2: Model impulse responses to productivity shock in deviations from steady state.
Dashed line - ”first-best”, solid line - credit frictions.
further declines because of the capital’s response last period.
The situation is very different in the presence of credit frictions (solid lines). Due
to a 0.2% productivity decline firms’ capital falls by around 4%. The large decline
in capital is explained by a large decrease in firms’ net worth. When productivity
declines not only do firms produce less, but they also have to repay a relatively large
debt, inherited from yesterday. In addition to that, the price of capital declines, and
this reduces their net worth even more. Perhaps surprisingly, the price of capital
does not decrease by much more than it does in the ”first-best” scenario. This is a
result of capital supply elasticity being quite high. In the next section I experiment
with different values of ν.
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Wages and employment also display far larger decreases compared to the ”first-
best” economy. Employment falls by around 0.7%, and wages by around 1.3%. This
is evidence that financial frictions have a substantial effect on the marginal product of
labour. Also, this raises hope that once search and matching frictions are introduced
a small negative productivity shock will lead to a significant unemployment increase.
Overall, the model generates promising impulse responses in terms of amplifica-
tion. Unfortunately, however, the model generates little propagation. The effects of
the shock are short-lived, after the first two months differences between the economy
with credit frictions and the ”first-best” analogue disappear.
One way of improving this would be adding a delay in the investment decisions.
For example, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) consider a situation when in a given period
a firm may have an opportunity to invest only with a given probability. A drawback
of this approach, however, is that this only influences responses to a positive, rather
than a negative, productivity shock. When the economy experiences an increase in
productivity, firms want to invest but, in case of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), not
all of them can. As a result there is a delay in capital’s response. But if there is
a negative shock, then it does not matter that they can’t invest, they would not
want to even if they could. So the amplification remains large but there is almost
no propagation.
Bernanke et al. (1999) use a one-quarter investment delay, which improves prop-
agation. More importantly, they also assume Calvo pricing in the goods market,
which means that prices could be adjusted only with a given probability. This gen-
erates hump-shaped responses of the variables to a shock even without the financial
accelerator. The responses are amplified when it is present.
Numerical simulations show that as a result of a 0.2% positive productivity shock
the credit constraint stops binding. Intuitively, a positive shock increases firms’ net
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worth. Because they still want to invest as much as possible, they buy a lot of
capital. In principle, they should also borrow a lot according to the credit constraint.
However, firms know that in the next period the productivity is going to be lower,
because it converges to the steady state, and they will have to repay a relatively large
debt from today. Hence, borrowing up to the limit is not as attractive anymore, and
firms prefer to borrow less. In this model this happens already for very small positive
productivity shocks.
Now I turn to exploring what happens to impulse responses if I change the values
of some of the parameters. I start with the minimum dividend share, then capital
supply elasticity, and finally labour supply elasticity.
1.4.3 Minimum dividend requirement
Consider what happens if there is no minimum dividend requirement, or c̄ = 0.
Consider the implications for the model’s steady state. If c̄ = 0, then the profit
constraint requires the firm’s flow profit to be greater or equal to 0. If this is not
true in steady state, that is the firm makes losses every period, the firm would be
better off not operating at all. Therefore, in steady state the profit constraint does
not bind.
Now consider what happens if the economy is hit by a negative productivity shock
while c̄ = 0. There are two possible scenarios. The first is that the profit constraint
still does not bind, firms have enough net worth to afford the ”first-best” level of
capital. In this case impulse responses would look like the ”first-best” ones in Figure
1.4.2. The second possible scenario is that the shock is big enough for firms not to
be able to afford the ”first-best” level of capital. In this case the profit constraint
binds, the firm invests all of its net worth into capital.
It appears that when c̄ = 0 the profit constraint does bind for an unexpected
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0.2% negative shock considered previously. The impulse responses are presented in
Figure 1.4.3, along with the impulse responses under the baseline calibration.
Figure 1.4.3: Model impulse responses to productivity shock in deviations from steady state.
Dashed line - c̄ = 0, solid line - baseline, c̄ = 0.3.
There is almost no difference between the two cases. This is because firms’ net
worth is affected in a similar way in both cases. When the shock hits, in both cases
firms have to repay a relatively large debt inherited from yesterday. This makes the
profit constraint bind when c̄ = 0. In case of c̄ = 0.3 this makes the already-binding
profit constraint bind even more. Hence, the net worths decline by similar orders of
magnitude when c̄ = 0 and when c̄ = 0.3, and this leads to large decreases in capital,
and other variables.
In the period following the shock there is a slight difference depending on the
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value of c̄. The economy with c̄ = 0 reverts to the ”first-best” economy faster than
the one with c̄ = 0.3. When the firm that has no minimum dividend requirement, it
can afford the ”first-best” level of capital sooner.
Therefore, this is evidence that the assumption about minimum dividend require-
ment is not as strong as one might think. One great advantage of the requirement
is that the profit constraint becomes almost always-binding, at least in steady state
and around it. And this considerably simplifies solving the model in the presence of
aggregate uncertainty, which I consider in the following chapters.
1.4.4 Capital supply elasticity
In this section I analyze how the model reacts to changes in capital supply elasticity.
Consider first the ”first-best” economy. If the capital supply elasticity is high, this
means that the supply curve is quite flat, and the quantity supplied responds a lot
to a change in capital price. Then, when a negative shock occurs, demand for capital
decreases, and this results in a large decrease in capital and a fairly small decrease
in its price. This is what one could observe from Figure 1.4.4.
In the economy with higher ν (dotted line) capital responds more to the shock
than in the economy with lower ν (dotted line). I choose values for high and low ν
based on upper and lower bounds of the estimates in House and Shapiro (2008).
Such behaviour has some interesting implications for the economy with credit
frictions. The impulse responses are presented in Figure 1.4.5.
On impact, capital falls more when its supply elasticity is low compared to when
it is high, and that is the opposite to what we observe in the ”first-best” economy.
After the first couple of months it reverts back to the ”first-best” level as it does in
the baseline case.
The difference on impact could be explained by looking at what happens to firms’
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Figure 1.4.4: ”First-best” economy impulse responses to productivity shock in deviations from
steady state. Dashed line - ν = 6, dotted line - ν = 14, solid line - baseline, ν = 10.
net worth. On impact, the net worth falls significantly because firms have to repay
a large steady-state debt given today’s lower productivity. As a result capital falls
as well, and so does its price, and precisely because of the lower supply elasticity
the price falls more when ν = 6 compared to when ν = 14. Moreover, static and
dynamic multipliers also contribute more to the price decrease when ν = 6 rather
than when ν = 14. Once firms start anticipating productivity shocks correctly, this
effect disappears.
Thus, despite the fact that usually, if supply elasticity is low, prices respond to
shocks more than they do if supply elasticity is high and quantities respond less, in
the presence of credit frictions on impact the opposite happens. It is because of the
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Figure 1.4.5: Model impulse responses to productivity shock in deviations from steady state.
Dashed line - ν = 6, dotted line - ν = 14, solid line - baseline, ν = 10.
fact that capital price declines more when capital supply elasticity is lower, firms’
net worth goes down more leading to a greater decline in capital.
Employment and wages follow capital’s pattern because of the complementarity
of factors of production. They also go down more when capital supply elasticity is
lower.
1.4.5 Labour supply elasticity
In the previous section I discussed the consequences of changing capital supply elas-
ticity in the model. In this section I turn to changing the labour supply elasticity. It
turns out that results are again different in the model with credit frictions compared
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to the ”first-best” economy model.
Consider first how the ”first-best” economy reacts to changing the elasticity. In
Figure 1.4.6 dashed lines are impulse responses if ε = 0, so the labour supply is
perfectly inelastic, dotted lines present impulse responses if ε = 1, so the labour
supply is a 45 degree line.
Figure 1.4.6: ”First-best” economy impulse responses to productivity shock in deviations from
steady state. Dashed line - ε = 0, dotted line - ε = 1, solid line - baseline, ε = 0.5.
In case of perfectly inelastic labour supply, employment stays at its steady-state
value. Wages decline by around 0.27% on impact and then slightly more because of
the nature of the production technology. As one would expect, when labour supply
elasticity is higher, ε = 1, in equilibrium employment falls from its steady-state value
(by almost 0.25%), and wages fall as well but by less compared to when ε = 0.
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As in case with capital supply elasticities discussed in the previous section, the
implications of different labour supply elasticities are different under credit frictions.
In Figure 1.4.7 wages and employment both decline more when when labour supply
elasticity is higher.
Figure 1.4.7: Model impulse responses to productivity shock in deviations from steady state.
Dashed line - ε = 0, dotted line - ε = 1, solid line - baseline, ε = 0.5.
An explanation for this result lies in the behaviour of the marginal product of
labour, specifically in how it is affected by capital. Suppose the labour supply elas-
ticity is high. Then, as a result of an unexpected productivity shock employment
falls by relatively more compared to the situation with a low labour supply elas-
ticity. Now notice that as employment falls, so does firms’ net worth, even despite
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the fact that wages fall as well.9 As the net worth declines, so does capital. Due
to the financial accelerator the fall in capital is substantial, more importantly it is
far greater than the decrease in labour. Therefore, the marginal product of labour
declines as a result of a negative shock. Thus, the more elastic labour supply is, the
more employment falls and the more capital falls. In turn, the more capital falls, the
more marginal product of labour falls and, hence, wages.
Again, credit frictions change how wages behave straight after a productivity
shock depending on how elastic labour supply is.
1.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I have developed a partial equilibrium model with frictionless labour
market where firms face credit frictions in the form of collateral constraints as in
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). I show that the collateral constraint together with the
profit constraint, which prevents a firm from borrowing from its shareholders, cre-
ates a link between the firm’s capital demand and its net worth. This link leads to
a large capital decline in response to a negative productivity shock. Through com-
plementarity of the factors of production the decrease in capital affects employment
and wages. As a result of one standard deviation negative productivity shock em-
ployment falls by around 0.65% and wages fall by around 1.3% as opposed to 0.11%
and 0.25%, respectively, in the first-best economy.
The results from the model indicate that an introduction of search and matching
frictions into it could bring some interesting results. First of all, amplification of a
shock could be significantly increased, which contributes to the solution of Shimer
(2005) puzzle. Second, it would be interesting to study the interaction of the two
9 When wages are equal to the marginal product of labour, the gross profit is Akα−1l
1−α −wl =
αAkα−1l
1−α, which is increasing in l.
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frictions, particularly because of the potential spillover effect from search frictions
to credit ones. The effect is likely to happen through the wage bill, and that will
surely influence the firm’s net worth. Finally, having heterogenous firms would allow
to take the model to firm-level data and confront its predictions.
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AFL(K−1, L) = w (1.38)
• labour supply
L = L̄wε. (1.39)
In order to obtain the impulse response functions in the main text I proceed as
follows.
1. Solve for the model’s steady state and obtain the steady-state values of capital
K∗, labour L∗, debt B∗ and capital price q∗.
2. Set K−1 = K
∗ and B−1 = B
∗.
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3. Guess q0 which denotes the price of capital in the period when the shock occurs.
4. Use the guessed value of q0, q
guess
0 , together with the following equations to







[(1− c̄)(AF (K∗, L0)− w0L0) + qguess0 (1− δ)K∗ −RB∗] (1.40)
AFL(K











[(1− c̄)(AF (Ki−1, Li)− wiLi)] (1.43)




Note that qi(1 − δ)Ki−1 = RBi−1 for i ∈ [1, T ] because the path of all shocks
(except for the initial one) is known to all agents in the economy.
6. Solve for the price of capital backwards. In the aftermath of the shock the
economy eventually reverts back to the steady state.10 By imposing qT = q
∗








7. Use the solution from step 6 to update qguess0 .
10In my simulation I use T = 3000. I also check that the shock goes back to its steady-state value
of 1 in that time frame.
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8. Repeat steps 4-7 until convergence, that is until |qguess0 − q
fromstep6
0 | < ζ.
First-best economy
The ’first-best’ economy differs from the economy with credit constraints because of
the way how capital demand is determined. In the first-best case the capital demand
equation is
βAFK(K,L




In this case I solve for K, L and w by using equations (1.35), (1.37)-(1.39) and (1.47).
The solution for the price of capital q is then obtained as described in step 6 in the
previous section.
Economy without minimum dividend requirement (Section 1.4.3)
To solve for the impulse responses of the economy where firms do not face the
minimum dividend requirement, that is c̄ = 0, I follow these steps:
1. Solve numerically for K, L, w and q as if the profit constraint does not bind
or, in other words, obtain their first-best solutions.
2. Check the value of the flow profit in each period given solutions from step 1.
3. In periods when the flow profit is negative impose the binding profit constraint
and resolve the model using the strategy described above.
4. Check that the solution is correct by verifying that in periods where the basic
model solution is adopted the Lagrange multipliers associated with the profit
constraint µ are positive, whereas in periods when the first-best solution is
adopted the flow profit is not negative. If any of the checks fail, apply the
other solution (basic model or first-best) and recheck.
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Chapter 2. Interaction between
credit and search frictions
I introduce a model in which a representative firm faces two types of frictions. On
one hand, when hiring workers it faces standard search and matching frictions. On
the other hand, it faces credit frictions in the form of collateral constraints which
determine its ability to borrow and invest. I study the interaction of the two fric-
tions. Credit frictions affect labour demand through complementarity of capital and
labour as factors of production: due to the financial accelerator, a negative shock
induces a much greater rise in unemployment than in the model with search frictions
only. Search frictions influence capital demand through wages: When wages are only
partially flexible, the decline in firms’ net worth is larger, and the resulting fall in
capital is larger as well. I also find that the response of wages to wage flexibility
is non-monotonic in the presence of credit frictions. There exists a scenario where
more flexible wages fall less as a result of a shock compared to more rigid ones. This
is in contrast to the model with search frictions only where more flexible wages always




The financial crises of 2008 was characterized by disruptions in credit markets and
sharp and prolonged rises in unemployment. It is natural to postulate a link between
the two markets which may potentially shed light on yet unexplained macroeconomic
fluctuations in labour markets. It was shown in Chapter 1 that credit frictions,
by affecting firms’ capital demand, also have an influence on firms’ employment
decisions. That is because capital and labour are complementary in the production
process. This Chapter continues investigating the link between the two markets, but
now I consider not only the effect of credit frictions on labour market outcomes, but
also a potential effect of search frictions on capital market outcomes.
A worsened financial position of a firm in the presence of credit frictions is char-
acterized by a reduction in its net worth. The depressed net worth reduces the firm’s
ability to invest, and the firm’s capital demand decreases. Note that the wage bill
has a direct effect on the firm’s net worth. With search and matching frictions in the
labour market, wages are no longer determined by the labour market equilibrium,
and therefore, play an important role in forming the firm’s net worth.
It is natural to imagine that the size of the search frictions effect on capital
demand depends on wage rigidities. If wages are rather rigid, they should fall less as
a result of a negative technology shock leading to a larger decrease in capital demand
which can then further depress labour demand through complementarity of factors
of productions.
To address the question of interaction between frictional capital and labour mar-
kets I consider a model in which a representative firm faces two types of frictions.
Firstly, it faces credit frictions in the form of collateral constraints, as in Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997). Secondly, it faces standard Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) search
and matching frictions in the labour market. I consider how the model compares to
41
one with credit frictions only, and also to one with search frictions only. I find that
under both frictions responses of variables, including capital and employment, to a
productivity shock are much larger than the ones under only one friction. This in-
dicates that there indeed are effects going from credit frictions to the labour market
and from search frictions to the capital market.
I then proceed by examining how wage flexibility affects the model outcomes.
I find that more flexible wages dampen the responses of variables to the shock, as
expected. The more flexible wages are, the less firms’ net worth falls as a result of
a negative shock. Thus, capital demand also declines less when wages are flexible.
Through complementarity of capital and labour, firm’s labour demand falls less as
well.
Interestingly, I find that the response of wages to different wage flexibilities is non-
monotonic. This is in contrast to the model with search frictions only where more
flexible wages always fall more as a result of a negative shock leading to a smaller
decline in employment. This is not always true under search and credit frictions
where more flexible wages sometimes fall less as a result of the shock. The reason
is that under search and credit frictions, as net worth falls considerably less under
flexible wages, capital and employment also decline significantly less, and so does the
marginal product of labour. Because it is natural for more flexible wages to depend
more on the marginal product of labour they also decline less. This result points to
a possible explanation of why in times of financial distress wages are observed to fall
little in data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the related
literature. The model is described in Section 2.3. In Section 2.4 I discuss the cali-
bration strategy and quantitative applications of the model. Section 2.5 concludes.
42
2.2 Related literature
There is a vast literature that considers how credit frictions affect macroeconomic
fluctuations, including fluctuations in the labour market. Some of it I have already
discussed in Chapter 1. Here, I would like to concentrate on papers which consider
frictional labour markets. This research could be divided into two strands which
differ according to their strategies of modelling capital markets. In the first strand,
which this paper is a part of, capital markets are modeled explicitly. Firms use both
capital and labour to produce output. They face credit frictions when they invest,
and they face search frictions when they hire workers. The second strand of literature
assumes that firms produce output using only labour, and they need financing from
frictional credit markets in order to post vacancies.
Gaŕın (2015), Zanetti (2015) and Mumtaz and Zanetti (2016) belongs to the first
strand of literature. Gaŕın (2015) expands Jermann and Quadrini (2012) model with
debt and equity financing. He includes asset prices feedback in credit constraints and
search and matching frictions in the labour market. In his model, as in Jermann and
Quadrini (2012), in the event of a negative shock firms decide whether to issue equity,
which is costly, or to fire workers. One of the difference between my research and
his is that in my model firms are not allowed to issue equity. This results in a link
between capital demand and net worth which results in large responses of capital to
small productivity shocks. Another difference is how wages are determined. In Gaŕın
(2015) wages are determined by Nash bargaining but when firms make capital and
labour decisions they take wages as given. In other words, firms abstract from the
fact that wages of existing workers change when an additional worker is hired due
to the diminishing marginal product of labour. This effect is present in the model
that follows.
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Zanetti (2015) also extends the model in Jermann and Quadrini (2012) by in-
cluding search and matching frictions. However, as opposed to this work, he models
frictions in the labour market by following the approach of Blanchard and Gaĺı (2010)
in which vacancies get filled immediately by paying a hiring cost. Thus, the surplus
of a match to a firm is just equal to the hiring cost. Wages are then determined by
Nash bargaining. The author does not consider a link between net worth and capital
demand, and thus does not study the influence of the wage bill on net worth, which
is one of the goals of this paper.
Mumtaz and Zanetti (2016) combine approaches in Bernanke et al. (1999) and
Blanchard and Gaĺı (2010) to develop a model of credit and labour market frictions.
On one hand, as in Bernanke et al. (1999), they use the asymmetry of information
between creditors and borrowers, and a related costly state verification problem, to
model credit frictions. On the other hand, they follow the approach in Blanchard
and Gaĺı (2010) to model labour market frictions. As in this paper, the authors
do consider the effect of labour market frictions on capital demand. However, they
find that labour market frictions affect capital demand through depressed hiring
only, whereas in this paper both depressed hiring and changes in the wage bill in-
fluence capital demand. Moreover, as indicated by experiments with wage flexibility
presented in this Chapter, the importance of the latter channel cannot be ignored.
The second strand of literature, in which capital markets are not explicitly mod-
eled, includes papers by Monacelli et al. (2011), Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2013)
and Petrosky-Nadeau (2014).
Monacelli et al. (2011) consider a standard search and matching model in which
firms issue debt under limited enforcement. Lenders are assumed to be able to recover
only a part of the debt in the event of default. When a firm is created it chooses
debt this period but produces and bargains wages only next period. Under this
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assumption, the authors argue that the firm strategically chooses to borrow up to the
limit in order to bargain lower wages with its worker. Therefore, in times of financial
distress, modeled as negative credit shocks rather than negative productivity shocks
which I consider in this paper, lower debt puts firms in less favourable bargaining
position in wage negotiations, and this results in depressed hiring.
The main difference between Monacelli et al. (2011) and my work is that I consider
a different transmission channel of credit frictions into the labour market, which is
through complementarity of capital and labour, and I also explore how the wage bill
affects firms’ ability to invest.
Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2013) and Petrosky-Nadeau (2014) both consider
setups where firms need to borrow from frictional credit markets in order to post
vacancies. Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2013) present a model of an economy
with double search frictions. In their model, projects get matched to bankers in
order to form a firm, then firms are matched to workers in order to produce output.
The authors find that as a result of credit frictions firms face increased costs of hir-
ing which increase the elasticity of labour market tightness to productivity shocks.
Petrosky-Nadeau (2014) considers an economy in which firms need external financing
to post vacancies but lending relationships are subject to a problem of costly state
verification. Moreover, the author considers the terms of financial contracts which
are time-varying and counter-cyclical. He finds that credit frictions increase firms’
hirings costs, and more so in a recession. This improves the responses of labour mar-
ket tightness to productivity shocks compared to the standard search and matching
model.
My work is different from both of the papers described above because modelling
capital demand explicitly allows to study the interaction between search and credit
frictions, the effect of search frictions on capital demand through wages in particular.
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I now turn to describing the model with search friction in the labour market and
credit frictions in the capital market.
2.3 Model
The model in this section extends that in Chapter 1 as follows. First, workers
face search and matching frictions in the labour market, and second, firms face
uncertainty over future aggregate productivity shocks.1 Capital side of the economy
mimics Chapter 1. For completeness, I present it as before but draw attention to
differences.
Consider a discrete-time infinite horizon economy which is populated by a mass
of firms, normalized to 1, a representative household, and capital suppliers. Firms
are owned by the household which consists of a mass of workers equal to the labour
force, L̄.
A typical firm produces output y, taken as the numeraire, using capital k−1,
installed last period, and workers l:2
y = AF (k−1, l), Fk > 0, Fkk < 0, Fl > 0, Fll < 0, Fkl > 0. (2.1)
In equation (2.1) A represents a stochastic aggregate productivity level, the current
value of which is revealed to firms and the household at the beginning of a period.
There are no idiosyncratic shocks so all firms are identical in their decisions.
The firm buys capital on a competitive capital market at price q. Capital is
1In Chapter 1 I abstracted from aggregate uncertainty because I wanted to investigate how
minimum dividend requirement affects the model results. As it was discussed in Chapter 1, without
this assumption the profit constraint does not bind in steady state but may bind around it. This
introduces occasionally binding constraints into the mode which are much easier to deal with in
deterministic environment.
2Hereafter, I denote last period values with a subscript, −1, future values with a prime,
′,
derivatives with respect to a particular variable or variables with their corresponding subscripts.
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assumed to depreciate every period at rate δk.
3
In contrast to Chapter 1, in order to hire workers the firm must post vacancies
v at cost c per vacancy. I assume that the labour market is subject to Mortensen
and Pissarides (1994) search and matching frictions. Consequently, it takes time for
a firm to fill a vacancy, and similarly, it takes time for an unemployed worker to find
a job. If, in total, there are U unemployed workers in the market and V vacancies
are posted, then the number of job-worker matches is given by a matching function
M = M(U, V ). As is conventional, the matching function is assumed to exhibit
constant returns to scale. An unemployed worker thus faces a job-finding probability
f(θ) = M/U = M(1, V/U), and the firm faces a vacancy-filling probability ϕ(θ) =
M/V = M(U/V, 1), where θ = V
U
is a ratio of vacancies to unemployment, also
known as labour market tightness.
The firm pays wages w(k−1, l, A) to its workers; these will be discussed in detail
below. Workers separate from jobs at exogenous rate δl at the end of each period.
As in Chapter 1, credit frictions affect the firm via two constraints, à la Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997). Firstly, the firm faces a credit constraint. Each period the firm
may sign a one-period debt contract with the household which allows the firm to
borrow b units of output at a gross interest rate R. Because ex post the firm may
withdraw itself from production, and use this as a credible threat to renegotiate
a smaller repayment of the loan with its creditors, ex ante creditors impose the
following constraint:
Rb ≤ Eq′(1− δk)k. (2.2)
The constraint says that the debt repayment value should be smaller or equal to
expected market value of the firm’s capital corrected for depreciation. As in Iacoviello
3As the reader will see further, I assume for convenience that the capital depreciates after the
next period’s production is complete (y = AF (k−1, l)) rather than at the beginning of next period
(y = AF ((1− δ)k−1, l)).
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(2005), the constraint (2.2) generalizes the credit constraint in Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997) to a stochastic setup.
Secondly, the firm faces a profit constraint. Consider the firm’s gross profit:
AF (k−1, l)− w(k−1, l, A)l − cv. (2.3)
In contrast to Chapter 1, it now also takes into account non-zero vacancy costs. The
firm has to pay a fixed share c̄ of its gross profit to the household as a minimum div-
idend. Thus, because the firm’s only way of borrowing is by signing debt contracts,
described above, it faces the following constraint:
(1− c̄)(AF (k−1, l)− w(k−1, l, A)l − cv) + b−Rb−1 − q(k − (1− δk)k−1) ≥ 0. (2.4)
The constraint says that at the end of each period the firm’s flow profit net of
minimum dividends must be either positive or zero. In other words, the constraint
(2.4) restricts how exactly the firm may borrow from the household, and that is
only through a debt contract. If the flow profit turns out to be positive, the firm
distributes it as extra dividends.
The two constraints (2.2) and (2.4) are crucial for the financial accelerator effect
to take place. The credit constraint restricts how much the firm can borrow from
the household through debt contracts. Additionally, it introduces a powerful asset
price effect because the amount that the firm can borrow depends on the expected
capital price. So, if the expected price of capital decreases, the firm is able to
borrow less. In turn, the profit constraint ties capital demand to the firm’s net
worth. If net worth declines, then capital demand declines as well. Moreover, with
capital price variability, the price of capital also decreases, which a leads to an even
deeper decrease in the firm’s net worth, and its capital demand. Therefore, a small
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productivity shock ia able to generate a substantial response of capital demand.
The firm’s objective is to maximize the expected present discounted value of its
profits by choosing capital, debt and the number of vacancies to post:
Π(k−1, b−1, l−1, A) = max
k,b,v
{
AF (k−1, l)−w(k−1, l, A)l−cv+b−Rb−1−q(k−(1−δk)k−1)+
+ βEΠ(k, b, l, A′|A)
}
, (2.5)
subject to the credit constraint
Rb ≤ Eq′(1− δk)k, (2.6)
the profit constraint
(1− c̄)(AF (k−1, l)− w(k−1, l, A)l − cv) + b−Rb−1 − q(k − (1− δk)k−1) ≥ 0, (2.7)
and also the fact that, by the law of large numbers, the number of hires should be
equal to the expected number of filled vacancies:
l − (1− δl)l−1 = ϕ(θ)v. (2.8)
Using equation (2.8) to substitute in for v gives the firm’s value function, which I
use in the remainder of the paper:
Π(k−1, b−1, l−1, A) = max
k,b,l
{




− q(k − (1− δk)k−1) + βEΠ(k, b, l, A′|A)
}
. (2.9)
In the next section I turn to discussing the timing of the model in more detail,
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as well as the laws of motion of aggregate employment and unemployment.
2.3.1 Timing
The firm inherits from the previous period capital k−1 and debt Rb−1, which has to
be paid back to the household this period, from the previous period. Workers arrive
to the period in one of the two states: employed or unemployed. Denote by U the
pool of unemployed workers at the beginning of the period.
Figure 2.3.1: Timing.
At the beginning of the period the firm observes a realization of the productivity
shock. Based on the realization, it makes its decision on how much capital k to
buy, how much funds b to borrow, and how many vacancies v to post. The firm
then posts vacancies according to chosen v which implies aggregate vacancies which,
together with aggregate unemployment U , determine labour market tightness, θ,
and hence the job-finding, f(θ), and vacancy-filling, ϕ(θ), probabilities. Workers are
then matched to firms, and that determines the aggregate employment level in the
economy L.
When the matching process is complete, the firm produces, pays wages and pays
the minimum dividend to the household. Capital k−1 then depreciates, the firm
repays its debt, borrows again by signing a new debt contract with the household
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and invests into capital. It also pays extra dividends to the household if it has any
funds left. At the end of the period, exogenous separations occur, and the economy
moves into the next period.
The timing implies that the stock of unemployed workers observed at the begin-
ning of each period evolves according to the following rule:
∆U ′ = δlL− f(θ)U. (2.10)
So the change in unemployment depends positively on the number of workers exoge-
nously separated from their employers, and negatively on the number of unemployed
workers who have found jobs. Also, given the adding-up constraint U ′+(1−δl)L = L̄,
the law of motion for aggregate employment is characterized by:
∆L = f(θ)U − δlL−1. (2.11)
The next two section describe credit and capital markets and the firm’s optimal
levels of debt and capital. The markets function very similarly to the ones in Chapter
1, so sections below are summaries of what was described in more detail in Chapter
1.
2.3.2 Credit market
Consider a credit market equilibrium in which firms borrow. The equilibrium interest
rate R∗ is determined by intersection of supply and demand curves.
The supply of debt is provided by the household. The household has a discount
factor βh. Thus, it is willing to lend as long as the interest rate is greater or equal
to the inverse of βh. I assume that the household is more patient than firms.
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Assumption 1. β < βh.
This ensures that in and around steady-state equilibrium firms borrow and the
household lends.
The firm’s demand for debt is dictated by the first-order condition of the problem
(2.9) with respect to b:
1− βR− λR + µ− Eµ′R = 0, (2.12)
where λ denotes the Lagrange multiplier on the credit constraint and µ denotes the









λ is greater than 0, and the credit constraint binds, meaning that the firm borrows
up to the maximum, if two conditions are satisfied.
The first one is βR < 1. Imagine that the firm does borrow up to the maximum,
then the competitive credit market ensures that the representative household makes
zero profit from loans. It is implicitly assumed that the household does have at least
Eq′(1−δk)
R
of free funds that it is willing to lend. This ensures that the credit constraint





Therefore, by assumption 1, βR∗ < 1, and the first condition is satisfied.
The second condition for the credit constraint to bind is that Eµ′ should not be
much greater than µ.4 The intuition for this is as follows. If the firm expects its








future net profit to be greater than the current one, Eµ′ < µ, then it would borrow
up to the limit, first, because the interest rate is attractive, and, second, because
it will be able to repay the debt in the future. The same intuition applies when
Eµ′ = µ or Eµ′ is even slightly smaller than µ (see the footnote). On the other
hand, if the firm expects its future net profit to be significantly lower that than the
current one, it may not be optimal for it to borrow up to the limit today because
it will have to then repay a relatively large debt in the future. In this case, it does
not borrow up to the maximum today. In fact, it may actually decide to become a
creditor and lend some its profit to the household. In this case, it will have an extra
return in the future when its profit is small.
Thus, the second condition for the credit constraint to bind need not always hold.
However, in simulations reported in Section 2.4 I check that the credit constraint does
bind.
Aggregating over all firms, and assuming that they do always borrow up to the





I now turn to a brief discussion of the capital market.
2.3.3 Capital market
Capital suppliers face increasing marginal costs S(K), where K denotes their ag-




ν , ν > 0. (2.16)
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On the other hand, capital suppliers’ marginal benefit from selling a unit of capital
is the difference between its price today and its price tomorrow, corrected for depre-
ciation. When optimizing, capital suppliers use the rule of the marginal cost being
equal to the marginal benefit:




The parameter ν thus reflects the steady-state elasticity of capital supply.
Now consider the firm’s capital demand. The first-order condition of the firm’s
problem (2.9) with respect to capital is:
− (1 + µ)q + λ(1− δk)Eq′ + βE(1 + µ′(1− c̄))[A′Fk(k, l′)− wk(k, l′, A′)l′]+
+ β(1− δk)E(1 + µ′)q′ = 0. (2.18)
Rearranging and using equation (2.13) to substitute in for λ gives:
βE(1 + µ′(1− c̄))[A′Fk(k, l′)− wk(k, l′, A′)l′] = (1 + µ)
[





− β(1− δk)cov(µ′, q′). (2.19)
Equation (2.19) equates the marginal benefit of buying an extra unit of capital to the
marginal cost. It is different from the one in Chapter 1, first, because it includes the
covariance term due the uncertainty over productivity shocks, and second, because
there is a potential effect of having more capital on wages. The covariance term is
subtracted from the marginal cost of buying capital today because, if it is positive,
buying more capital today makes the firm’s net worth higher tomorrow and, at
the same time, it relaxes tomorrow’s profit constraint. So the marginal cost of
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buying capital is lower. As for the wage effect, this will be discussed in more detail
below, but the basic idea is that it is natural for wages to depend on the marginal
product of labour, which in turn depends on how much capital the firm has. So
[A′Fk(k, l
′) − wk(k, l′, A′)l′] is essentially a share of the firm’s marginal product of
capital.
As in Chapter 1, equation (2.19) is different from the no-credit-frictions capital
demand rule, β[A′Fk(k, l
′)− wk(k, l′, A′)l′] = q − β(1− δk)Eq′, in three ways. First,
the marginal benefit of having an extra unit of capital is larger with credit frictions
because buying more capital today relaxes tomorrow’s profit constraint. Second, the
marginal cost of buying an extra unit of capital is higher because buying another unit




capital is not only used in the production process, but also as collateral. Thus, when





Consider a scenario when the profit constraint binds for all sequences of produc-
tivity shocks, µ > 0 for any A and Eµ′ > 0. Then,
(1−c̄)
[







Using the credit constraint to substitute in for b gives a familiar expression, which








AF (k−1, l)− w(k−1, l, A)l −
c
ϕ(θ)
(l − (1− δl)l−1)
]
+




The firm’s net worth includes its gross profit and the value of its capital holdings
less the debt repayment.
In contrast to Chapter 1, the firm’s net worth takes into account vacancy costs
and wages which are no longer determined by the labour market equilibrium. The
latter is an important channel of transmission of search frictions to capital demand.
Wages influence the financial accelerator effects on capital demand by affecting both
the static and dynamic multiplier effects introduced by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
Consider how each of those are affected in turn.
The static multiplier is a current period multiplier that occurs holding the future
constant. As today’s decrease in productivity lowers today’s capital demand, the
price of capital declines as well. This is because the user cost has to decrease to clear
the market. The fall in q lowers the firm’s net worth, which decreases its capital
demand even more. The static multiplier effect, however, is different from the one in
Chapter 1 because of wages. Notice that when today’s productivity decreases, wages
decrease as well. So the overall decline in AF (k−1, l)−w(k−1, l, A)l depends on how
flexible wages are. If wages are more flexible, they will fall more and the resulting
decline of the net worth and capital will be relatively small. If they are more rigid,
the decline will be relatively large.
Note that wage rigidity also plays a role in the first-best allocation of capital,
βE[A′Fk(k, l
′)−wk(k, l′, A′)l′] = q−β(1− δk)Eq′. However, since capital demand in
this case does not depend on net worth, the financial accelerator effects do not take
place and the effects of a decrease in productivity are much smaller. Therefore, the
effects of wage rigidity are a lot smaller too.
The dynamic multiplier is a multiplier that links the future to the present via the
credit constraint. As the firm’s capital today goes down because of lower produc-
tivity, so does its net worth tomorrow. Again, the more rigid wages are, the more
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the net worth falls, and the more tomorrow’s capital demand falls. The decrease
in tomorrow’s capital demand lowers its expected price. This tightens the credit
constraint today, and the firm is forced to borrow less. Thus, it is able to invest less,
and its capital demand decreases further.
In this scenario, to obtain aggregate capital demand I assume that the production
function exhibits constant returns to scale. This assumption may be relaxed, but
it simplifies aggregation. Thus, adding up individual capital demands, given by














+ q(1− δk)K−1 −RB−1
]
, (2.22)
which exhibits all of the features of individual capital demands described above.
In Chapter 1 I also describe what happens when the profit constraint never binds.
The consequences of that in this model are very similar.
When simulating the model I consider cases when the profit constraint does
always bind. I check that this holds in the simulations that I report in Section
2.4. This, of course, may not hold for every sequence of productivity shocks. If
the value of A is high enough, the firm may not be profit constrained anymore.
Although assuming an always-binding constraint is not entirely accurate in terms of
the resulting numerical solution, it has a great advantage of simplifying the solution
of the model.





As already mentioned, labour supply in the economy is fixed and equal to the size of
the labour force, L̄. Consider labour demand. The first order condition of the firm’s
problem (2.9) with respect to l gives:
(1 + µ(1− c̄))AFl(k−1, l) = (1 + µ(1− c̄))
[





− βE(1 + µ′(1− c̄)) c
ϕ(θ′)
(1− δl). (2.23)
Imagine for a moment that the profit constraint does not bind for any values of A, so
µ = µ′ = 0. Then, equation (2.23) simply states that the marginal product of labour
should be equal to the marginal cost of hiring an extra worker. The latter comprises
the following costs. First, it includes the worker’s wage. Second, it takes into account
current hiring costs net of expected future hiring costs, corrected for separations.
Expected future hiring costs influences today’s labour demand because hiring an
extra worker today saves the cost of hiring her tomorrow. Finally, the marginal cost
also includes the effect of hiring an extra worker on wages of existing workers. When
an additional worker is hired the marginal product of labour decreases. To the extent
that wages are linked to the marginal product of labour, the wage of each worker
falls.
Now consider the effect of the profit constraint on labour demand. First, note
that in (deterministic) steady state it does not have any effect on the labour demand.
Since in steady state the Lagrange multipliers satisfy µ = µ′ ≥ 0, this implies that
1 + µ(1 − c̄) > 0. Therefore, dividing both sides of equation (2.23) by 1 + µ(1 − c̄)
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gives a labour demand equation as if µ = µ′ = 0:






Here, credit frictions affect the labour demand only though the complementarity of
capital and labour, as in Chapter 1. When the firm’s capital declines the marginal
product of labour falls as well. Therefore, the firm’s labour demand decreases, and
it hires less workers.
Out of steady state, however, labour demand is affected by the relative sizes of µ
and Eµ′. In other words, it depends on how much more or less the profit constraint
binds today compared to how much it is expected to bind tomorrow. Consider the
right-hand side of equation (2.23). It can be split into two parts, today’s marginal
cost of hiring a worker, (1 + µ(1 − c̄))
[





savings of future marginal hiring costs βE(1+µ′(1− c̄)) c
ϕ(θ′)
(1−δl). Whereas the first
part is affected by today’s profit constraint, the second part is affected by tomorrow’s.
Imagine that, in expectation, the profit constraint binds tomorrow relatively more
than today, Eµ′ > µ. Then, in expectation, it is very costly for the firm to hire
tomorrow, and thus the firm is better off hiring more workers today and hence
saving on vacancy costs tomorrow. So relative to the steady state the firm overhires.
In the opposite situation, when the constraint binds relatively less tomorrow than it
does today, Eµ′ < µ, expected savings on future vacancy costs are small. The firm
knows that it is going to be relatively cheap to hire tomorrow, so it underhires today
relative to the steady state.
While Eµ′ > µ is likely during the aftermath of a positive shock, Eµ′ < µ is likely
during recovery after a negative shock. The latter contributes to the propagation of
the recovery process when firms effectively delay hiring until it is cheaper in terms
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of the impact on net worth.
Wages
The main purpose of this paper is to explore the feedback effect from labour frictions
back to capital demand. As already discussed, this feedback effect exists because the
wage bill influences the firm’s net worth, and therefore, its capital demand. A very
important question, then, is how wages are determined.
Search and matching frictions in the labour market imply that each employment
relationship creates a rent to be split between the firm and the worker. As pointed
out by Hall (2005), these rents could be split in many different ways which means
that there exists a range of feasible wages in each job-worker match.
In Hall (2005) model firms produce output according the production function
y = Al which omits capital and exhibits constants returns to scale. In this setting
he considers the following wage schedule:
w = w̄Aτ , 0 ≤ τ < 1, (2.25)
where w̄ is a constant and τ is the elasticity of the wage with respect to productivity.
The chosen wages are partially rigid with respect to labour productivity.
Michaillat (2012) then appeals to Hall (2005) in a setting with large firms. Given
diminishing returns to labour in production function y = Alα, which also omits
capital, he considers wages given by (2.25). In his setting, this form of wages means
that they are fully rigid with respect to the number of workers and partially rigid
with respect to aggregate productivity.
However, this form of rigid wages is critiqued in Brügemann (2014). He shows
that they are privately inefficient off the equilibrium path, and therefore cannot
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be a result of any theory of wage determination that yields private efficiency. The
intuition for this result is as follows. Over the course of one period the firm makes two
decisions about the number of workers to hire. First, it decides how many vacancies
to post (which relates to how many workers it wants to hire through the law of large
numbers). Second, after the recruiting costs are sunk and the matching is complete,
it decides how many workers to actually employ among those who got matched to
the firm.
Now if the firm’s profit, excluding vacancy costs, is a (weakly) increasing function
in l, then private efficiency would require that the number of workers resulting from
the first decision should be equal to the number of workers resulting from the second









where π(l, A) = Alα−w(l, A)l is the firm’s gross profit. Denote the solution to (2.26)
l∗. Now if π(l, A) is (weakly) increasing in l, then l∗ would definitely be the solution




Brügemann (2014) points out that wages given by (2.25) imply that the firm’s gross
profit π(l, A) is not monotonic in l. Furthermore, he claims that there is no simple
restrictions on exogenous parameters that would achieve monotonicity, except for the
trivial w̄ = 0. Therefore, in a setting with diminishing returns such wages cannot be
consistent with any sharing mechanism that produces private efficiency on and off
the equilibrium path.
Brügemann (2014) suggests using the following wages that are privately efficient
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on and off the equilibrium path:
w = w̄Aτ lα−1, 0 ≤ τ < 1. (2.28)
These wages are flexible with respect to employment and partially rigid with respect
to productivity shocks.
In my model, which includes capital in the production function y = F (k−1, l), I
implement the following wage schedule for the Cobb-Douglas form:
w(k−1, l, A) = w̄1Ak
α
−1l
−α + w̄2u, w̄1 ≥ 0, w̄2 ≥ 0, (2.29)
with w̄1 and w̄2 being flexibility parameters and u denotes workers’ value of leisure.
These wages includes features of wages in both Michaillat (2012) and Brügemann
(2014). On one hand, as in Michaillat (2012), they contain a constant term which
does not depend on the firm’s number of workers. This makes them more rigid than
wages in Brügemann (2014). On the other hand, as in Brügemann (2014), they
include a term which depends on the number of workers but also on capital since
capital takes part in the production process. This makes wages more flexible than
wages in Michaillat (2012).
Notice that in equation (2.29) I effectively set wage elasticity to productivity
shocks τ equal to 1. Thus, I do not distinguish between wage rigidity with respect
to aggregate productivity, capital or labour. Instead, I consider how wages depend
on the average labour productivity.
The assumed form of wages is admittedly somewhat ad hoc, and it would be
interesting to see, if wages are split by a surplus-sharing rule, how credit frictions
affect the splitting process. Chapter 3 investigates this question. The main challenge
is that under credit frictions wages affect firms’ net worth, and this significantly
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complicates the solution to the surplus-sharing rule.
The advantage of using wages given (2.29) is that by varying parameters w̄1 and
w̄2 one could see how these affect the model results. When w̄1 is high, wages vary
a lot with labour productivity, so they are more flexible in this sense. When w̄1 is
low, wages are more rigid. I discuss how this affects the demand for capital.
This section concludes the description of the model. The next section discusses
the calibration strategy and quantitative applications of the model.
2.3.5 Deterministic steady-state equilibrium
In the simulations that follow, for a range of positive c̄, I have been able to find
only one deterministic steady-state equilibrium in which both the credit constraint
and the profit constraint bind. The equilibrium is described by eight equations
which jointly determine steady-state values of capital, employment, debt, the price
of capital, labour market tightness, the interest rate, wages and unemployment
{K∗, L∗, B∗, q∗, θ∗, R∗, w∗, U∗}.










3. Firms invest as much as possible into capital. As a result, firms’ capital demand
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Note that firms’ net worth in steady state is their revenue after wage and mini-
mum dividend payments. If compared to the dynamic capital demand equation
(2.22), the terms q∗(1−δk)K∗ and R∗B∗ are missing in (2.32) because in steady
state the value of land is exactly offset by the required debt repayment.
4. Labour demand (or job-creation condition) is determined by setting the marginal
product of labour equal to the marginal cost of hiring an additional worker:
AFL(K



















7. The law of motion for employment, where ∆L is set to be equal to 0:
f(θ∗)U∗ = δlL
∗. (2.36)
Equation (2.36) says that the number of unemployed workers who find jobs
should be equal to the number of employed workers who lose their jobs.
64
8. The adding-up constraint:
U∗ + (1− δl)L∗ = L̄. (2.37)








The calibration strategy mirrors the calibration strategy in Chapter 1 on the capital
side.
The model time period is taken to be equal to one week. The productivity shock
evolves according to the following geometric AR(1) process:
lnAt = ρ lnAt−1 + ε, ε ∼ N(0, σ2). (2.39)
Following King and Rebelo (1999) I assume quarterly values of ρ and σ to be 0.979
and 0.0072, respectively, which implies weekly autoregressive parameter of 0.998 and
weekly standard deviation of 0.002.5
When calibrating discount factors I follow Iacoviello (2005) and set βh = 0.999
and β = 0.998 which corresponds to his quarterly values of 0.99 and 0.98, respec-
tively. These values imply an internal rate of return for a firm which is twice as large
5Given the shock process E[lnAt+m| lnAt] = ρmE[lnAt]. Thus, ρweek = ρ1/13quarter. Also, since
V ar(lnAt) =
σ2








as the rate of return faced by the household.
I assume that the production function is of the Cobb-Douglas form and that
capital share of output is equal to 1/3, F (k, l) = k1/3l2/3. Capital depreciation rate
is assumed to be equal to 10% a year, or 0.19% a week.
I set the value of c̄, the minimum dividend share of gross profit, equal to 30%
which is a median of the dividend payout ratio (ratio of dividends paid to net income)
across S&P500 firms over the last 10 years.6
House and Shapiro (2008) obtain estimates of investment supply elasticities in
the interval between 6 and 14. In steady state this investment elasticities imply the
same capital supply elasticities. I set ν to be equal to 10, which is a midpoint of
their estimates.
On the labour side, the calibration strategy is as follows. I assume a conventional
matching function of the Cobb-Douglas form, M = χUψV 1−ψ. Based on the evidence
in Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001), I set matching elasticity ψ to be equal to 0.6.
I calibrate matching efficiency χ in the same way as Elsby and Michaels (2013):
I target a steady-state job-finding rate equal to 0.1125, which is consistent with
a monthly rate of 0.45 reported by Shimer (2005). At the same time, I target a
steady-state value of labour market tightness of 0.72 as in Pissarides (2009). Since
f = χθ1−ψ, this implies that χ should be equal to 0.1283.
I set the value of the job destruction rate δl to be equal to 0.0078, which is
consistent with estimates in Shimer (2012). As in Michaillat (2012), I set the labour
force L̄ to be equal to 1.
I calibrate the cost of opening a vacancy, c, to be such that per worker hiring
cost c/ϕ is equal to 14% of the quarterly worker compensation estimated by Silva
and Toledo (2009), that is c/ϕ = 0.14 · 13Ew.7 Since ϕ = χθ−ψ = 0.16 in steady
6http://www.factset.com/websitefiles/PDFs/dividend/dividend_9.28.15
7Note that the model time period is one week, so to get quarterly wages I have to multiply
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state, this implies that c/Ew = 0.29. Thus, c should be equal to 29% of an average
worker wage.
Following Hall and Milgrom (2008) I calibrate the value of leisure u to be equal
to 70% of average labour productivity.
Finally, I calibrate the wage flexibility parameters w̄1 and w̄2 in the following
way. I experiment with values of w̄1, which is responsible for how much wages react
to labour productivity. Then, for each value of w̄1 I calibrate w̄2 so that steady-state
job-finding rate is equal to 11.25%. This implies that steady-state unemployment
rate is equal to 6.5%. Various combinations of w̄1 and w̄2 are shown in Table 2.4.1
along with the other calibrated parameter values.
weekly wages by 13.
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Table 2.4.1: Calibrated model parameters
Description Parameter Value
Firm’s discount factor β 0.998
Households’ discount factor βh 0.999
Capital share α 1/3
Labour share γ 2/3
Minimum dividend share c̄ 0.3
Capital supply elasticity ν 10
Matching elasticity ψ 0.6
Matching efficiency χ 0.1283
Job destruction rate δ 0.0078
Labour force L̄ 1
Autoregressive parameter ρ 0.998
Volatility σ 0.002
Vacancy cost c 0.1
Value of leisure u 0.32
Wage parameter 1 w̄1 0.3
Wage parameter 2 w̄2 0.649
Vacancy cost c 0.09
Value of leisure u 0.28
Wage parameter 1 w̄1 0.5
Wage parameter 2 w̄2 0.4525
Vacancy cost c 0.08
Value of leisure u 0.22
Wage parameter 1 w̄1 0.7
Wage parameter 2 w̄2 0.268
Vacancy cost c 0.05
Value of leisure u 0.14
Wage parameter 1 w̄1 0.9
Wage parameter 2 w̄2 0.0746
2.4.2 Interaction between search and credit frictions
Before I move on to investigating how wage flexibility affects the model outcomes, it is
useful to compare the results of the model with both frictions to results of the model
when one of the frictions is turned off. To do so, I examine impulse response functions
of different models to an unexpected, persistent negative productivity shock. Note
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that, once the shock realizes, firms in the model know that it is going to last according
to the process described in the calibration section. As in Chapter 1 I take the size
of the shock to be equal to one standard deviation. Figure 2.4.1 presents the shock
and its evolution over time.
Figure 2.4.1: One standard deviation negative productivity shock.
The three models that I consider are a) the one with both search and credit
frictions, b) one with search frictions only, and c) one with credit frictions only.
The first model, with both frictions, is the one described in this Chapter. In the
second model, with search frictions only, firms still face the credit constraint but
they do not face the profit constraint. This implies that they are constrained in
terms of borrowing at rate R but they still can borrow as much as they want from
the household at higher rate 1
β
. This economy is in some sense the ”first-best”
economy, as explained in Chapter 1, but with added search frictions and rigid wages.
I calibrate the model with search frictions only in the same way as I calibrate the
one with both frictions.
The third model that I consider is the one with credit frictions only. This one
is similar to one of the model specifications from Section 4.5 in Chapter 1 with
inelastic labour supply. So here wages are completely flexible, and thus adjust to
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Figure 2.4.2: Impulse responses to productivity shock in deviations from steady state. Solid line
- credit and search frictions, dashed line - search frictions, dotted line - credit frictions.
equate labour supply to labour demand. The only difference from Chapter 1 is the
uncertainty over aggregate productivity shocks.
In this section I consider impulse responses when w̄1 = 0.5. So wages are some-
where in between being completely flexible, w̄1 = 1, and completely rigid, w̄1 = 0.
I check that, qualitatively, changes between the models remain the same for other
values of w̄1 which lie between 0 and 1 reported in Table 3.6.1.
Figure 2.4.2 depicts impulse responses of capital, employment, capital price and
wages in different models, whereas Figure 2.4.3 depicts impulse responses of unem-
ployment, labour market tightness and job-finding rate. Solid lines stand for the
model with both frictions, dashed line for the one with search frictions only, and
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Figure 2.4.3: Impulse responses to productivity shock in deviations from steady state. Solid line
- credit and search frictions, dashed line - search frictions, dotted line - credit frictions.
dotted line for the one with credit frictions only. Note that in Figure 2.4.3 there
no dotted lines because there is no unemployment in the model with credit frictions
only.
It can be seen from the graphs that responses of all variables are much larger
in the model with both frictions compared to those with only one friction. This
is because there is a significant interaction between the two frictions. From capital
friction into labour demand through the marginal product of labour, and from labour
friction to capital demand though wages.
Consider the model with credit frictions only - the dotted lines in Figure 2.4.2.
In this model the response of capital is much smaller than it is in the model with
both frictions. This is because wages adjust freely and firms’ employment remains
constant. Intuitively, when the labour supply is fixed and wages are fully flexible,
the net worth of a firm does not fall by much when a negative productivity shock
hits because wages adjust. Therefore, capital demand also does not decline a lot,
and neither does its price. The overall financial accelerator effect is small. Note that
because wages are equal to the marginal product of labour, which falls on impact
considerably less than under both frictions, wages also do not initially fall by as
much as they do under both frictions. This feature is related to wage flexibility and
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is discussed in more detail in the next section.
Consider now the model with search frictions only - the dashed lines in Figures
2.4.2 and 2.4.3. In this model capital is determined by the frictionless Jorgensonian
first-order condition, and it is thus at its ”first-best” level. So, as the marginal
product of capital falls because of the fall in aggregate productivity, capital decreases
as wells. But because there is no financial accelerator effect, the decline in capital
is relatively small. Despite the fact that wages only partially adjust to the decline
of the marginal product of labour, the decline in employment is still small and
is approximately equal to the decrease in productivity. The other labour market
variables respond accordingly.
Now consider the model with search and credit frictions now - the bold lines.
When compared to the case with search friction only, the model predicts much larger
responses of its variables to the shock. With the financial accelerator the effects on
variables are significantly amplified.
The model with search and credit frictions also generates more propagation than
the model with search frictions only. Unemployment rate stays higher under search
and credit frictions for longer. This is because under both frictions firms delay hiring
until it becomes cheaper in terms of its effect on net worth.
When compared to the model with credit frictions only, the model with both
frictions generates larger responses because when wages are not fully flexible the
firm’s net worth decreases more than it does under full wage flexibility. This affects
capital demand and, through complementarity of capital and labour, the number of
hires.
While this discussion is useful in terms of understanding the differences between
the three models, understanding how each friction works and how it impacts the other
friction, I now turn to examining how wage flexibility affects the model outcomes.
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2.4.3 Role of wage flexibility
We saw that the model with both frictions generates much larger responses of vari-
ables to productivity shocks. The reason is that, on one hand, credit frictions affect
firms’ labour demand because capital and labour are complementary in the produc-
tion process, and on the other hand, search frictions affect capital demand because
wages play an important role in shaping firms’ net worth. Now consider how different
wage flexibilities affect model outcomes.
Figure 2.4.4: Impulse responses to productivity shock in deviations from steady state under
search frictions only. Solid line w̄1 = 0.5, dashed line w̄1 = 0.3, dotted line w̄1 = 0.7.
Let me start by considering how wage flexibility affects capital demand and other
variables under search frictions only. Figures 2.4.4 and 2.4.5 show the impulse re-
sponses. Solid lines indicate the responses when wages are medium rigid, dashed
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Figure 2.4.5: Impulse responses to productivity shock in deviations from steady state under
search frictions only. Solid line w̄1 = 0.5, dashed line w̄1 = 0.3, dotted line w̄1 = 0.7.
lines when wages are most rigid, dotted lines when wages are most flexible.
As one would expect, when wages are more flexible they respond most to the
shock, leading to a smaller decline of employment. The effect in turn spills over to
capital demand, the capital price and the other labour market statistics in Figure
2.4.3. When wages are more rigid, they respond less to the shock, and so the drop
in employment and the other variables is large.
Now consider the implications in the model with search and credit frictions. The
impulse responses are shown in Figures 2.4.6 and 2.4.7. It could be seen that the
more rigid wages are, the more capital and employment respond to the shock. This
indicates that, indeed, wage flexibility significantly affects how economy responds to
productivity shocks. When wages are more rigid, net worth falls more as a result of
a negative shock leading to a larger decrease in capital demand. This effect persists
back into labour market through the marginal product of labour.
In contrast to the model with search frictions only, the effects of different wage
flexibilities are significantly amplified. This is due to the financial accelerator effect.
When capital is determined by net worth (Figure 2.4.6) it falls much more than it
does when it is determined by frictionless first-order condition for capital (Figure
2.4.4). This leads to larger responses of employment and the other labour market
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Figure 2.4.6: Impulse responses to productivity shock in deviations from steady state under
search and credit frictions. Solid line - w̄1 = 0.5, dashed line - w̄1 = 0.3, dotted line - w̄1 = 0.7.
variables.
Now consider wages under search and credit frictions presented in the bottom
right panel of Figure 2.4.6. It could be seen that equilibrium wages are almost
invariant to wage flexibility. Looking closer, one could observe that medium rigid
wages (solid line) fall on impact more than both more rigid (dashed line) and more
flexible (dotted line) wages. The reason for that is that change in wages is determined
by their flexibility parameters and labour productivity. More rigid wages fall by less
than medium rigid wages because they depend more on constant unemployment
benefit and less on labour productivity. On the other hand, more flexible wages,
which depend more on labour productivity, fall by less than medium rigid wages
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Figure 2.4.7: Impulse responses to productivity shock in deviations from steady state under
search and credit frictions. Solid line - w̄1 = 0.5, dashed line - w̄1 = 0.3, dotted line - w̄1 = 0.7.
because the fall in labour productivity is smaller under more flexible wages.8
Overall, it could be concluded that the change in wages is non-monotonic in wage
flexibility. This is in contrast to the results of the model with search frictions only
where more flexible wages always fall by less than more rigid ones as a result of a
shock. This result may potentially explain why we see wages fall little in data. This is
because wages may respond to changes in labour productivity which are endogenous
to flexibility of wages.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper I have introduced a model in which the representative firm faces two
types of frictions. In the labour market, it faces standard search and matching fric-
tions when hiring workers. In the credit and capital markets, it face credit frictions
in the form of collateral constraints. I then study the interaction of the two frictions.
Credit frictions affect the firm’s labour demand through complementarity of capital
and labour as factors of production. When the firm’s net worth decreases, its cap-
ital and labour demands decrease. Because of the financial accelerator the rise in
8In fact, when wage flexibility increases the model converges to the model with credit frictions
only. This result is presented in Appendix.
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unemployment is much greater than in the model with search frictions only.
There is also an effect going from search frictions to capital demand which is
via wages. The wage bill plays an important role in forming the firm’s net worth.
Therefore, wage rigidities affect changes in net worth resulting from productivity
shocks. More rigid wages result in greater decreases in net worth than more flexible
wages. As a result firms’ capital demand decreases more, and the effect persists into
the labour market.
While studying how wage flexibility affect impulse responses of macroeconomic
variables I also find that responses of wages to different wage flexibilities are non-
monotonic, which could potentially explain why wages are observed to fall little in
data.
In this Chapter, I established that wages indeed have a significant influence on
the firm’s net worth, and thus on its capital demand. The next step would be to
examine how wages look like if they are determined not by a general rule, by rather
by firms and workers sharing surpluses created by their employment relationships.
This will shed light on how different their shares are, if different at all, depending
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Figure 2.5.1: Impulse responses to productivity shock in deviations from steady state. Solid line
- credit frictions only, dashed line - search and credit frictions w̄1 = 0.9, dotted line - search and
credit frictions w̄1 = 0.7.
In Figure 2.5.1 dotted and dashed lines depict the impulse responses in the model
with search and credit frictions under different wage flexibilities, w̄1 = 0.7 and w̄1 =
0.9 respectively, solid lines present the impulse responses in the model with credit
frictions only. It could be seen that the more flexible wages are, the more impulse
responses look like the ones under credit frictions only. As for wages, more flexible
wages (dashed line) fall less on impact than less flexible (dotted line) because of the
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smaller fall in labour productivity.
B Simulations
In order to get the numerical impulse responses from Section 2.4 I first solve for the
deterministic steady state ({εt} = {0}). I then use Dynare9 to solve for linear policy
rules K(K−1, L−1, B−1, A−1, ε), L(K−1, L−1, B−1, A−1, ε), B(K−1, L−1, B−1, A−1, ε),
as well as q(K−1, L−1, B−1, A−1, ε) implied by a first-order
10 Taylor series approx-
imation around the deterministic steady state.
Using these policy functions, I am then able to simulate what happens if the
economy is hit by an unexpected shock, and I can also calculate the values of all the
other variables presented on the graphs in the main text.
9Dynare (http://www.dynare.org) is a set of Matlab code files that linearizes a model around
its deterministic steady state and solves for the coefficients of linearized policy functions.
10I also experiment with second-order approximations. Results are very similar to those reported.
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Chapter 3. Wages and Credit
Frictions
In this paper I use a model where firms face search and credit frictions to investigate
wages determined by surplus sharing in such environment. I find that credit frictions
affect the surplus-sharing mechanism in such a way that they increase the worker’s
effective bargaining power. That is, the firm and the worker negotiate wages as if
the worker had a higher bargaining power. The reason for this is that under search
and credit frictions the firm values workers more that under pure search frictions
because output they produce increases the firm’s net worth which, as a result of credit
frictions, determines its ability to invest in capital. However, the effective worker’s
bargaining power appears to be endogenous to the firm’s capital holdings and the
number of employees. The more capital the firm has, the less the firm is financially
constrained, and the lower wages its workers are able to extract. Due to endogeneity




The times of financial distress are usually characterized by disruptions in credit
markets which naturally persist into firms’ capital investment. While it has been
shown that decreased capital investment affects the labour market because capital
and labour are complementary in the production process, it is perhaps an interesting
question whether it also affects wages determined by surplus sharing between firms
and workers. The channel through which credit frictions may affect wages deter-
mined by surplus sharing is likely to be through the firm’s surplus of a match. It
is reasonable to assume that this surplus should somehow be affected by the firm’s
financial position. So far, the literature has not been able to answer this question,
as will be discussed further.
In this paper I use the model from Chapter 2 where firms face search frictions in
the labour market and credit frictions in the capital market to examine wages deter-
mined by surplus sharing under search and credit frictions. Due to the diminishing
marginal returns to labour, firms and workers share the marginal surplus as in Stole
and Zwiebel (1996). I find that credit frictions affect the surplus-sharing mechanism
in such a way that they increase the worker’s effective bargaining power. That is,
the firm and the worker negotiate wages as if the worker had a higher bargaining
power. The reason for this results is that under search and credit frictions the firm
values the worker more that under pure search frictions because output she produces
increases the firm’s net worth which determines its ability to invest into capital.
However, the effective worker’s bargaining power appears to be endogenous to
the firm’s capital holdings and the number of employees. The more capital the firm
has, the less it becomes financially constrained, and the lower wage the worker is
able to extract. Due to the endogeneity of the worker’s effective bargaining power,
the effect of credit frictions on wages is ambiguous.
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This paper is related to several strands of literature. Firstly, it is related to the
literature which discusses model with both search and matching and credit frictions,
discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. Secondly, because I consider wages deter-
mined by surplus sharing between a large firm and its workers, it is related to papers
that discuss the underlying game theory mechanism. Thirdly, this paper has com-
mon features with papers that embed surplus sharing in large firms into search and
matching environment. I now discuss each these strands in turn.
The first strand of literature considers models with two types of frictions: search
and matching frictions and credit frictions. As already discussed in Chapter 2, some
of the papers model credit frictions as frictions affecting capital market, Gaŕın (2015),
Zanetti (2015), Mumtaz and Zanetti (2016), and some of them model credit frictions
affecting directly labour markets, Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2013), Petrosky-
Nadeau (2014), Monacelli et al. (2011).
This strand of literature significantly contributed to the motivation for this work.
To my knowledge, this is the first paper that investigates how surplus sharing, and
the resulting wages, are affected by the fact that the firm is constrained in its invest-
ment into capital. The latter is important because it is a natural characteristic of a
recession.
Gaŕın (2015) uses Nash-bargained wages in a model with search and credit fric-
tions. However, he assumes that firms take wages as given when making a decision
about the number of hires. Wages under this assumption do not take into account
the effect of hiring an extra worker on wages of incumbent workers. This effect is
present in wages in this paper.
Zanetti (2015) and Mumtaz and Zanetti (2016) consider Nash-bargained wages
under search and matching friction as in Blanchard and Gaĺı (2010), where the firm’s
surplus from a match is equal to hirings costs because matching is instantaneous. In
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contrast, I consider a model where matching a job to a worker takes time, and the
firm’s surplus of the match takes into account the effect of hiring an extra worker on
the firm’s profit and its constraints.
In Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2013) and Petrosky-Nadeau (2014) capital
market is not modeled explicitly. In their setting, Nash bargained wages are only
affected by credit constraints through increased costs of hiring. In Petrosky-Nadeau
and Wasmer (2013) wages under credit constraints include a new procyclical com-
ponent such that, when labour market tightness increases, the worker’s bargaining
position improves, which results in more volatile wages. Petrosky-Nadeau (2014)
finds the opposite effect. In his model, the terms of credit contracts are counter-
cyclical. This results in counter-cyclical hiring costs. Thus, wages include a new
term which results in a strengthened bargaining position of the firm during an up-
turn. Therefore, the response of wages to shocks are dampened compared to the
standard search and matching model.
In contrast, this paper benefits from modeling capital demand explicitly because
the effect of credit frictions on hiring costs is endogenous since it comes directly from
the firm’s problem in the capital market. Moreover, in my model wages are not only
different because of hiring costs, but also because the firm’s surplus from a match
is different under credit frictions. Although, so far I make conclusions only about
steady-state values of wages, in the future, this setup will help to shed light on wage
volatility under credit constraints as well.
In Monacelli et al. (2011) wages are based on surplus-sharing and are determined
by the Nash bargaining solution. However, the underlying model, where firms strate-
gically borrow up to the credit limit in order to bargain lower wages, is quite different
from my model, where firms borrow to finance capital investment.
The second strand of literature, to which this paper is related, discusses game
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theory mechanisms which determine surplus-sharing rules in large firms, which I con-
sider in this paper. In a setting with diminishing returns to labour, the size of the
firm matters for wage determination. The reason for this is that the marginal product
of labour is not constant, so the firm’s surplus of a match depends on the margin on
the number of employees. Stole and Zwiebel (1996) develop a non-cooperative bar-
gaining game where one firm employs several workers. Due to diminishing marginal
returns to labour, the firm knows that, if its negotiations with a given worker break
down, it will have to renegotiate wages with all of the remaining workers. Therefore,
the firm negotiates with each individual worker as if she marginal. Brügemann et al.
(2015) later show that the game itself in Stole and Zwiebel (1996) does not sup-
port wages that coincide with the workers’ Shapley values, as claimed in the original
paper, and propose an alternative bargaining game.
The last strand of literature which this work is related to is papers that consider
search and matching models in various settings with large firms and use the Stole
and Zwiebel (1996) bargaining solution for wage determination. This strand includes,
for example, papers by Cahuc and Wasmer (2001), Elsby and Michaels (2013) who
consider endogenous job separations, Acemoglu and Hawkins (2014) who focus on
the time-consuming side of search frictions and others. I use a similar to these papers
wage environment in the labour market, but consider how it is affected by frictions
in the capital market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. I summarize the model from Chapter
2 which I use to investigate wages under search and credit frictions in Section 3.2.
Section 3.3 discusses how wages based on surplus sharing are determined in the
environment which exhibits diminishing marginal returns to labour under pure search
frictions. In Section 3.4 I consider how wages are determined under search and credit
frictions. Section 3.5 presents a numerical example which summarizes findings from
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Section 3.4. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Model summary
3.2.1 Firm’s problem
Consider the framework discussed in Chapter 2 where a typical firm maximizes its
expected lifetime profit:
Π(k−1, b−1, l−1, A) = max
k,b,l
{




− q(k − (1− δk)k−1) + βEΠ(k, b, l, A′|A)
}
(3.1)
subject to the credit constraint:
Rb ≤ Eq′(1− δk)k, (3.2)
and the profit constraint
(1−c̄)
[







The firm produces output according to the production function AF (k−1, l), where
A denotes the aggregate productivity level and capital takes one period to install.
The firm buys capital in the capital market at market price q. Each period capital
depreciates at rate δk. Thus, the firm’s total capital investment is q(k− (1− δk)k−1).
The firms hires workers in the labour market which exhibits standard search and
matching frictions. The firm has to pay the hiring cost c
ϕ(θ)
per each workers hired.
θ denotes labour market tightness and ϕ(θ) is a vacancy-filling rate. Job-worker
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matches get destroyed at exogenous rate δl at the end of each period. The firm’s
pays wages w(k−1, l, A) to its workers, so its total wage bill is w(k−1, l, A)l.
In the credit market, the firm may sign a debt contract with the household and
borrow b units of output. Next period it has to repay the debt at interest rate R
determined by equilibrium in the credit market.
Due to the contracting problem described in more detail in Chapter 2 the firm
faces a credit constraint. The credit constraint (3.2) requires the firm to use capital
as collateral for its debt. It says that the expected market value of collateral next
period should at least cover the firm’s debt repayment.
The firm also faces a profit constraint. Each period the firm has to pay a minimum
dividend to the household. The minimum dividend should be equal to the share c̄ of
the firm’s gross profit
[
AF (k−1, l)− w(k−1, l, A)l− cϕ(θ)(l− (1− δl)l−1)
]
. The profit
constraint (3.3) says that the firm’s profits after paying minimum dividends should
not be negative. This implies that the only way how the firm may borrow from the
household is by signing a debt contract.
3.2.2 Some model features
In this section I summarize some of the model features that will be useful for ex-
plaining wage determination mechanisms in the next sections.
Consider first the credit market where a representative household supplies funds
to firms. I assume that the household is more patient than firms, β < βh. The
household is willing to lend as long as the interest rate is greater or equal to 1
βh
.
On the demand side, the firm is willing to borrow as long as the interest rate
is lower or equal to 1
β
. If the profit constraint does not bind much more tomorrow
than it does today, the firm is willing to borrow up to the maximum because it is
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relatively impatient. This means that the credit constraint (3.2) binds.1
The competitive credit market ensures that in equilibrium the household makes





We shall see that the interest rate will appear later in the wage equation.
In the capital market, capital suppliers face increasing marginal costs S(K). The
marginal benefit of supplying a unit of capital is the difference between its price
today and its price tomorrow, corrected for depreciation. When optimizing, capital
suppliers equate marginal benefit to marginal cost:




The firm’s demand for capital depends on whether or not the profit constraint
binds. If the profit constraint does not bind the firm has always the option to borrow
more from the household as its shareholder at higher rate 1
β
. So, the firm’s capital
demand is determined by the frictionless first-order condition with respect to capital.
The interesting case is when the profit constraint does bind which means that the








AF (k−1, l)− w(k−1, l, A)l −
c
ϕ(θ)
(l − (1− δl)l−1)
]
+
+ q(1− δk)k−1 −Rb−1
]
. (3.6)
As a result, when the firm’s net worth decreases the firm’s demand for capital de-
1For more details see Section 2.3.2 in Chapter 2.
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creases as well. This effect is large because when the demand for capital decreases
its price decreases as well. The reason is that the capital market has to clear. The
decline in the price of capital further reduces the net worth.
Additionally, as the firm’s capital demand decreases today, the firm’s expected
net worth tomorrow decreases as well. This is due to the fact that the firm is able
to produce less output tomorrow. As the net worth tomorrow decreases, so does
tomorrow’s demand for capital, and thus, the expected capital price. This tightens
the credit constraint today. Because the firm is able to borrow less today, its capital
demand today decreases even further.
Credit frictions affecting the firm’s capital demand persist into the firm’s labour
demand through complementarity of factors of production.
The relationship between net worth and capital demand is important for wages
based on a surplus-sharing rule, which I consider in this Chapter. The reason is that
in the presence of credit frictions the firm values its workers not only because they
produce output. In addition to that, by increasing the firm’s production workers
also relax the profit constraint. This increases the firm’s net worth which allows it
increase its capital investment. This makes wages under search frictions different
from wages under both search and credit frictions, as the reader will see in the
following sections.
I now turn to discussing how wages are determined in details. I start with wages
that the firm pays when it is not constrained. Wages under pure search frictions are
going to act as benchmark when I consider wages under credit constraints.
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3.3 Wages under search frictions
Consider first how wages are determined if there are no credit frictions - that is, if
the firm does not face the profit constraint. I will maintain the assumption that the
firm faces the credit constraint, so it is restricted in how much it can borrow at rate
R, but it can borrow an unlimited amount from the household as its shareholder at
higher rate 1
β
. The firm’s problem is then given by the value function (3.1) and the
credit constraint (3.2).
I assume that wages are determined by surplus sharing between firms and workers.
Due to diminishing marginal product of labour, they share the marginal surplus as
in Stole and Zwiebel (1996), rather than total surplus as in the standard Mortensen
and Pissarides (1994) model. The intuition for this is as follows. Due to search and
matching frictions in the labour market, it is costly for workers to find jobs and for
firms to fill vacancies. Because of that, each employment relationship creates a rent
which is shared between a firm and a worker. Moreover, the rent of each particular
employment relationship depends on the margin on the number of employees: The
more workers the firm employs the smaller this rent becomes as a result of the
diminishing marginal product of labour. Therefore, in the process of negotiating
with a given worker the firm knows that if this negotiations break down it will
have to renegotiate wages with all of the remaining workers. As a result of this, it
negotiates with each worker as if she was marginal.
Consider the marginal surplus of a match to the firm, J(k−1, l, A). At the time
of bargaining the firm has already paid hiring costs, so these are sunk. Thus, the
marginal surplus is





which comprises the marginal product of labour less the wage plus savings on future
hirings costs. The term wl(k−1, l, A)l captures how much the wages of inframarginal
workers change if an additional worker is hired.
The surplus of a match to a worker is the difference between her value of being em-
ployed, W (k−1, l, A), and her value of being being unemployed, Υ. If employed, each
period the worker receives her wage. Next period, the match could be exogenously
destroyed with probability δl, in which case the worker joins the unemployment pool
and gets the value of being unemployed. With probability (1 − δl), however, the
worker stays employed and continues obtaining the value of being employed. There-
fore, the value of being employed in a firm with capital k−1 and l workers is:
2
W (k−1, l, A) = w(k−1, l, A) + βE[δlΥ
′ + (1− δl)W (k, l′, A′|A)]. (3.8)
If the worker is unemployed she receives an unemployment benefit u in the current
period. Next period, she faces a probability f(θ′) to find a job and become employed,
and thus receives the value of employment. With probability (1 − f(θ′)) she stays
unemployed and continues to obtain the value of unemployment:
Υ = u+ βE[(1− f(θ′))Υ′ + f(θ′)W (k, l′, A′|A)]. (3.9)
Wages are then the outcome of Stole and Zwiebel (1996) surplus-sharing solution,
which generalizes Nash bargaining to a setting with diminishing returns:
(1− η)[W (k−1, l, A)−Υ] = ηJ(k−1, l, A), (3.10)
2Here I assume that workers’ discount factor is the same as firms’, β, rather than the household’s
βh. The equality of the discount factors allows to cancel terms in the process of wage derivations,
which is especially useful in the next section for wages under both frictions. This allows to keep
wages as simple and as tractable as possible.
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where η denotes the worker’s bargaining power.
3.3.1 Differential equation for wages under search frictions
In order to obtain a wage differential equation under pure search frictions from (3.10)
one should follow the steps below.
First, forwarding (3.10) one period ahead gives:
(1− η)[W (k, l′, A′)−Υ′] = ηJ(k, l′, A′). (3.11)
Consider the firm’s future surplus of a match J(k, l′, A′). In the next period, the
firm will choose the number of workers to hire according to the first-order condition
of the problem (3.1)-(3.2) with respect to labour, forwarded one period ahead:
AFl(k, l







From equation (3.12) it follows that the future marginal surplus of a match will be
equal to the future marginal hiring cost:




Therefore, substituting in for J(k, l′, A′) in equation (3.11) gives the following
simple expression for the future value of being employed






Now one can use this expression to rewrite current values of employment (3.8)
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and unemployment (3.9), which become
W (k−1, l, A) = w(k−1, l, A) + βE[Υ












Subtracting one from the other gives the following surplus of a match to a worker






[1− δl − f(θ′)]. (3.17)
Finally, substituting the firm’s surplus (3.7) and the workers’ surplus (3.17) into
the bargaining solution (3.10) gives an expression for the bargained wage:
w(k−1, l, A) = η
[




+ (1− η)u. (3.18)
Wages are increasing in workers’ bargaining power, the marginal product of
labour, unemployment benefit and marginal hiring costs. On the other hand, wages
decrease with wl(k−1, l, A)l. This term is explained by the fact that if wage negoti-
ations with a particular worker break down, the firm will have to renegotiate wages
with the remaining workers. Moreover, as the marginal product of labour decreases
with the number of workers hired, so do wages (wl(k−1, l, A) < 0). This means
that, if the worker walks away, the firm will have to increase wages of the remaining
workers. The worker knows about this, and thus the firm has to pay her a higher
wage.
Result (3.18) is a simple generalization of the differential equation for wages in
Elsby and Michaels (2013) to a setting with capital as second factor of production.
I will later compare this wage equation to the one under both frictions.
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3.3.2 Solution to differential equation for wages under search
frictions
The differential equation for wages (3.18) can be solved once one assumes a form
of the production function and sets a boundary condition. As in Chapter 2, I as-
sume that the production function is of the Cobb-Douglas form, and that it exhibits
constant returns to scale:








w(k−1, l, A)l = 0, (3.20)
which says the wage bill should not explode as the number of workers approaches
zero.
The solution to (3.18) then takes the following form:








+ (1− η)u. (3.21)
Wages increase with the marginal product of labour, marginal hiring costs and the
size of unemployment benefit.
Given a matching functions M(U, V ), where U is the number of unemployed
workers in the economy, and V is the number of vacancies, the job-finding rate is
f(θ) = M(U,V )
V
, and the vacancy filling rate is ϕ(θ) = M(U,V )
U
. Therefore, the ratio of
the two gives V/U = θ. Thus, the wage equation (3.21) could be written as




−α + βcEθ′] + (1− η)u, (3.22)
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which implies that wages linearly increase with labour market tightness.
This concludes the description of wages under search frictions only. I now turn
to the main part of the paper and look into how wages are formed in the presence
of both search and credit frictions.
3.4 Wages under search and credit frictions
In this section I follow the same steps as in the previous one but draw attention to the
differences implied by credit frictions. First, I consider the firm’s surplus of a match
followed by discussing the worker’s surplus of a match. Then, I derive a differential
equation for wages under search and credit frictions. I proceed by discussing wages
in steady state.
Consider the firm’s surplus of a match. Under credit frictions, the firm’s problem
is given by (3.1)-(3.3). Thus, as hiring costs are sunk at the time of surplus-sharing,
the firm’s marginal surplus of a match is given by:




(1− δl)(1 + µ′(1− c̄)). (3.23)
The firm’s marginal surplus (3.23) is different from the surplus under pure search
frictions (3.7) due to the presence of the Lagrange multipliers µ ≥ 0 and µ′ ≥ 0.
These state that the firm values the worker not only because she produces output,
but also because the increased production relaxes the profit constraint. To put it
another way, output produced by an extra worker increases the firm’s net worth,
which allows the firm to buy more capital. Thus, if the profit constraint binds, the
marginal surplus of a match to the firm is larger than when it does not bind. I
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discuss how µ is determined and what it depends on later in this section.
Now consider the surplus of a match to a worker, which is the difference between
the value of employment W (k−1, l, A) and unemployment Υ. These remain the same
as under pure search frictions. The value of employment is given by (3.8), and the
value of unemployment is given by (3.9).
The Stole and Zwiebel (1996) bargaining solution implies that the surplus is
shared according to the following rule:
(1− η)[W (k−1, l, A)−Υ] = ηJ(k−1, l, A). (3.24)
3.4.1 Differential equation for wages under search and credit
frictions
In order to derive a differential equation for wages under search and credit frictions
I follow the same steps as in Section 3.3.1.
First, by forwarding the bargaining solution (3.24) I obtain:
(1− η)[W (k, l′, A′)−Υ′] = ηJ(k, l′, A′). (3.25)
Next period, the first-order condition with respect to labour implies that the firm’s
marginal surplus should be equal to the marginal hiring costs:
J(k, l′, A′) = (1 + µ′(1− c̄)) c
ϕ(θ′)
. (3.26)
Thus, substituting for J(k, l′, A′) in (3.25) gives the following expression for the
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future value of employment to a worker:





(1 + µ′(1− c̄)), (3.27)
When substituting in for W (k, l′, A′) the value of unemployment to a worker becomes







(1 + µ′(1− c̄))
]
, (3.28)
and the value of employment becomes
W (k−1, l, A) = w(k−1, l, A)+Eβ
[





(1 + µ′(1− c̄))
]
. (3.29)
The difference between the two gives the surplus of a match to the worker:
W (k−1, l, a)−Υ = w(k−1, l, A)− u+ β
η
1− η
E(1 + µ′(1− c̄)) c
ϕ(θ′)
[1− δl − f(θ′)] .
(3.30)
Finally, the bargaining solution requires the worker’s surplus to be equal to a
fraction η
1−η of the firm’s surplus J(k−1, l, A). Multiplying equation (3.23) by
η
1−η
and equating it to (3.30) results in the following differential equation for wages under
search and credit frictions:
w(k−1, l, A) =
1
1 + ηµ(1− c̄)
[
η(1 + µ(1− c̄))[AFl(k−1, l)− wl(k−1, l, A)l]+
+ βηcE(1 + µ′(1− c̄))θ′ + (1− η)u
]
, (3.31)
which coincides with (3.18) in the absence of the profit constraint (µ = µ′ = 0).
The challenge of solving equation (3.31) is that, at the time of bargaining, the
Lagrange multiplier on the profit constraint is endogenous. That is, the extent to
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which the profit constraint binds depends on whether the firm hires the worker it
is negotiating wages with or not. Specifically, the value of µ is determined by the
first-order condition of problem (3.1)-(3.3) with respect to capital:3
βE(1 + µ′(1− c̄))[A′Fk(k, l′)− wk(k, l′, A′)l′] = (1 + µ)
[





− β(1− δk)cov(µ′, q′). (3.32)
Thus, the wage differential equation under search and credit frictions not only in-
cludes the term wl(k−1, l, A)l, but also wk(k, l
′, A′)l, which significantly complicates
its solution. For this reason, I consider wages in deterministic steady state in this
Chapter. The investigation of the dynamics of wages out of steady state is left for
future research.
3.4.2 Wages in deterministic steady state
In this section I discuss the differential equation for wages under search and credit
frictions in deterministic steady state and compare it to the differential equation for
wages under pure search frictions.
Consider a (deterministic) steady-state version of (3.31):
w(k, l, A) =
η(1 + µ(1− c̄))
1 + ηµ(1− c̄)
[(1− α)AFl(k, l)− wl(k, l, A)l + βcθ]+
+
(1− η)u
1 + ηµ(1− c̄)
. (3.33)
In contrast, the steady-state version of the differential equation under pure search
3The Lagrange multiplier on the credit constraint is substituted out using the first-order-
condition with respect to b.
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frictions (3.18) is given by:
w(k, l, A) = η[AFl(k, l)− wl(k, l, a)l + βcθ] + (1− η)u. (3.34)
There are two main difference between (3.33) and (3.34). The first difference is a
multiplier η(1+µ(1−c̄))
1+ηµ(1−c̄) in the first term, which is increasing in µ.
4 This multiplier
increases wages under search and credit frictions compared to wages under pure
search frictions. The intuition is that a constrained firm value workers more than
an unconstrained firm because output that workers produce in the constrained firm
raises its net worth. Thus, workers are able to extract higher wages as if they had a
higher bargaining power.
The second difference is the latter term, (1−η)
1+ηµ(1−c̄) , which is decreasing in µ. So
wages under credit frictions put less weight on the unemployment benefit compared
to wages under pure search frictions. This indicates that credit frictions change firms’
and workers’ bargaining weights. Denoting the first term by η̃, it appears that 1− η̃
is, in fact, equal to the second term:
1− η̃ = 1− η(1 + µ(1− c̄))
1 + ηµ(1− c̄)
=
1 + ηµ(1− c̄)− η(1 + µ(1− c̄))
1 + ηµ(1− c̄)
=
1− η
1 + ηµ(1− c̄)
.
(3.35)
Hereafter, I refer to η̃ as the worker’s effective bargaining power.
The worker’s effective bargaining power η̃ has two main characteristics. First, it
is increasing in the Lagrange multiplier µ meaning that the more constrained the firm
is, the more valuable its workers become, and thus the stronger workers’ bargaining
position becomes, η̃ ≥ η. The second characteristic is that the worker’s effective






/dµ = η (1−c̄)(1+ηµ(1−c̄))−η(1−c̄)(1+µ(1−c̄))(1+ηµ(1−c̄))2 = η
(1−c̄)(1+ηµ(1−c̄)−η−ηµ(1−c̄))
(1+ηµ(1−c̄))2 =
η (1−c̄)(1−η)(1+ηµ(1−c̄))2 > 0.
101
number workers at the time of wage negotiations. The reason for this is that µ is
endogenous, as explained in the previous section.
Consider how µ depends on k and l. From equation (3.32) the steady-state value
of µ could written as
µ = −










For the Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns to scale y = Akαl1−α
it is useful to rewrite (3.36) in terms of the capital-labour ratio κ:
µ(κ,A) = −










where I used the following notation: If wages are denoted by w(k, l, A) = ω(κ,A),
where κ = k
l
, then wk(k, l, A)l = ω
′(κ,A) and wl(k, l, A)l = −κω′(κ,A).
It is not entirely clear from equation (3.37) how µ depends on κ. However, it is
reasonable to assume that the Lagrange multiplier on the profit constraint µ depends
negatively on the capital-labour ratio. This is because the more capital the firm has
for a given number of workers, the less profit-constrained it should be. This claim
is later verified using a numerical example. Therefore, since the worker’s effective
bargaining power η̃ depends positively on µ, it is also decreasing in the capital-labour
ratio.
Consider now the effect of η̃ on wages. Since the worker’s effective bargaining
power increases when the firm becomes more constrained, it is clear that its direct
effect on wages is positive. This effect dictates that wages should increase when
the firm is experiencing financial difficulties because workers become more valuable.
However, there is a second effect that the worker’s endogenous bargaining weight has
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on wages. This effect appear through the term wl(k, l, A)l, which becomes different
in the presence of credit frictions compared to the case of pure search frictions. The
reason for this is precisely the change in bargaining weights, which are endogenous
to employment under credit frictions.
The term wl(k, l, A)l tells how wages of the remaining workers change if an ad-
ditional worker is hired. In the pure search frictions case, this term is negative due
the diminishing marginal product of labour (wl(k, l, A) < 0). The intuition is that,
if negotiations with a given worker break down, the marginal product of labour of
the remaining workers will increase, and so must their wages. Therefore, the higher
is the term −wl(k, l, A)l, the more the marginal product of the remaining workers
will increase, the higher wage the firm must pay to the given worker.
Under search and credit frictions, the term wl(k, l, A)l is also negative, as will be
verified in a numerical example, but it is different because it takes into account the
change in workers’ effective bargaining power.
Imagine that there exist values of k and l for which the change in the wage bill (if
an extra worker is hired) under search and credit frictions wscl (k, l, A)l is equal to the
change in wage bill change under pure search frictions wsl (k, l, A)l. Now consider how
they compare if the firm’s capital increases. Under pure search frictions, the increase
in capital implies that the marginal product of labour is higher, so −wscl (k, l, A)l
becomes more positive. This has a positive effect on wages.
In contrast, under search and credit frictions the increase in capital also implies
that workers’ effective bargaining power decreases because the profit constraint binds
less. We shall see that the bargaining power effect outweighs the marginal product
effect in the numerical example. Thus, the change in the firm’s wage bill if an extra
worker is hired is smaller under search and credit frictions than under pure search
frictions. Mathematically, if for given k1 and l1 −wscl (k1, l1, A)l = −wsl (k1, l1, A)l1,
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then −wscl (k2, l1, A)l1 < −wsl (k2, l1, A)l1 for k2 > k1. Thus, the term −wscl (k2, l1, A)l1
makes wages smaller under search and credit frictions.
Consider now the opposite scenario. Imagine that the firm’s capital decreases.
Then, under pure search frictions the marginal product of labour decreases, so the
term −wsl (k, l, A)l becomes less positive, which has a negative effect on wages. Un-
der search and credit frictions, the worker’s effective bargaining power increases,
therefore, in case of the breakdown of negotiations with a given worker, the firm
will have to pay higher wages to the remaining workers. So the term −wscl (k, l, A)l
becomes more positive. Mathematically, if for given k1 and l1 −wscl (k1, l1, A)l1 =
−wsl (k1, l1, A)l1, then −wscl (k3, l1, A)l1 > −wsl (k3, l1, A)l1 for k3 < k1.
Thus, for different values of k and l the term wl(k, l, A)l might have different
effect on wages. Under some combinations of capital and labour it may result in
higher wages compared to the pure search frictions case. Under some combinations
of capital and labour it may result in lower wages compared to the pure search
frictions case.
To sum up, wages under search and credit frictions are affected by endogenous
effective workers’ bargaining power. The bargaining power has a direct implications
for wages which is that the worker’s position in wage negotiations strengthens. It
also has an indirect effect on wages through the term wl(k, l, A)l which states how
much wages of the remaining workers change if negotiations with a given worker
break down. This term has an ambiguous effect on wages.
In the next section, I consider a numerical example which illustrates the effects
discussed in this section.
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3.5 A numerical example
3.5.1 Solution method
I have not been able to derive an analytical solution to the differential equation for
wages under credit and search frictions (3.33). One can verify that simple analytical
forms, such as isoelastic, do not solve (3.33). I therefore explore numerical solu-
tions to this equation, imposing the same boundary condition as for the differential
equation for wages under pure search frictions.
Firstly, in order to simplify the solution to (3.33) I use the Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion function y = Akαl1−α and rewrite the equation in terms of the capital-labour
ratio κ. This gives the following ordinary differential equation:
ω(κ,A) =
η(1 + µ(1− c̄))
1 + ηµ(1− c̄)
[(1− α)Aκα + κω(κ,A) + βcθ] + (1− η)u
1 + ηµ(1− c̄)
. (3.38)
I then use (3.37) to substitute for µ. Derivations and the resulting differential equa-
tion are presented in Appendix A.
As for the boundary condition, note that the condition (3.20) could be rewritten






Because the boundary condition (3.20) should hold for any value of capital, condi-
tions (3.20) and (3.39) imply the same solution for wages.
Finally, the results presented in the next section hold for a reasonable set of
parameter values reported in Appendix B.
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3.5.2 Numerical results
Consider firstly the values of the Lagrange multiplier on the profit constraint µ(κ,A)
and the values of the worker’s effective bargaining power η̃(κ,A) implied by the
solution to (3.38). These are presented in Figure 3.5.1 with µ (left panel) and η̃
(right panel) on the vertical axis and κ on the horizontal axis. The considered range
of values for κ ensures, first, that the profit constraint binds for all values of κ in this
range, and second, that the resulting wages are potential equilibrium candidates.5
(a) (b)
Figure 3.5.1: The Lagrange multiplier on the profit constraint µ(κ) (left) and the workers’
effective bargaining power η̃(κ) (right).
It could be seen form Figure 3.5.1 that both µ and η̃ are decreasing in the capital-
labour ratio. The reason is that for a given number of workers, if the firm has more
capital (resulting in higher κ), the profit constraint binds less. Therefore, as κ
increases, the Lagrange multiplier on the profit constraint decreases.
It was shown in the previous section that the worker’s effective bargaining power
η̃ is an increasing function of µ. Thus, in Figure 3.5.1b as capital-labour ratio
increases, µ decreases and η decreases as well. When µ reaches zero, η̃ reaches 0.4,
which is a chosen value for the worker’s bargaining power η.
5Workers are willing to accept these wages because these are higher than the value of unem-
ployment benefit.
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This shows the direct effect of η̃ on wages. When a firm is more constrained, its
marginal surplus of a match increases. This allows the workers to negotiate higher
wages as if they had a higher bargaining power.
Consider now the second effect of the worker’s endogenous effective bargaining
weight which is contained in the term wl(k, l, A)l. Note that rewritten in terms
of the capital-labour ratio wl(k, l, A)l becomes −κω′(κ,A). Figure 3.5.2 depicts
−wl(k, l, A)l = κω′(κ) > 0 as a function of κ. The solid line represents the values
of this term under search and credit frictions, whereas the dashed line represents its
values under pure search frictions.
Figure 3.5.2: κω′(κ) under search and credit frictions (solid) and under pure search frictions
(dashed).
The values of κω′(κ) coincides for κ ≈ 0.065. To the right of this value, the
worker’s effective bargaining power decreases, so if the firm’s negotiations with a
given worker breaks down, the remaining workers will have less bargaining power,
and the change in the firm’s wage bill would be smaller than it would have been
under pure search frictions.
To the left of the intersection of the two curves in Figure (3.5.2), the worker’s
effective bargaining power increases. The change in the firm’s wage bill if a worker
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walks away will be larger than it would have been under pure search frictions because
the remaining workers’ effective bargaining power increases.
Now consider a combined influence of the two effects on wages presented in Figure
3.5.3. Figure 3.5.3 depicts wages under search and credit frictions (solid) and wages
under pure search frictions (dashed) as functions of the capital-labour ratio.
Figure 3.5.3: Wages under search and credit frictions (solid) and under pure search frictions
(dashed).
One could see that for different values of the capital-labour ratio different effects
dominate. When κ is smaller than around 0.095, the firm’s profit constraint binds
considerably, and the worker’s bargaining power is very high. Thus, they are able
to negotiate higher wages than under pure search frictions. When κ is higher than
0.095, the firm is able to pay lower wages than under pure search frictions because,
if the worker walks away, the change in the wages of the remaining workers will be
much smaller than under pure search frictions due to a decrease in their bargaining
weight.
Overall, it could be concluded that the effect of credit frictions on wages is am-
biguous.
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3.6 Conclusions and discussion
In this paper I considered wages that are determined by surplus sharing between
firms and workers in the environment with both search and credit frictions. In the
model firms face credit constraints which affect their ability to invest in capital.
They also face standard search and matching frictions in the labour market.
I have shown that financial constraints affect wages by changing bargaining
weights of firms and workers but the overall effect on wages is ambiguous.
There are several extensions to this paper that are left for future work. The
first one is to solve for steady-state equilibrium with wages determined by surplus
sharing and compare the steady-states equilibrium values of labour market tightness,
unemployment, vacancies to those under pure search frictions.
The second extension would be to look into out-of-steady-state effects on wage so-
lution. Consider the differential equation for wages under search and credit frictions
(3.31) and the differential equation for wages under pure search frictions (3.18). The
two equations coincide when the worker’s bargaining power is equal to zero. When
η = 0 both equation imply that wages are equal to the unemployment benefit. Of
course, if the worker does not have any bargaining power then the firm has no in-
centive to pay her anything more that what she receives being unemployed.
Now consider the case where the worker’s bargaining power is equal to 1. Then
under search and credit frictions the worker receives
w(k−1, l, A) = Fl(k−1, l, A)− wl(k−1, l, A) + βcEθ′
1 + µ′(1− c̄)
1 + µ(1− c̄)
. (3.40)
Note that in a deterministic steady state where µ = µ′ this wage again coincides with
the wage the worker receives under pure search frictions. In this case, the worker
receives all of the firm’s surplus of the match. Out of steady state, wages are higher
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relative to steady state if the profit constraint binds tomorrow more than today.
In this case, paying hiring costs tomorrow is very costly for the firm because these
costs significantly decrease its future net worth. The firm is better off hiring more
workers today, its labour demand increases, and the firm has to pay higher wages.
On the other hand, if the profit constraint binds more today than tomorrow, it is
relatively cheap to hire workers tomorrow, so today’s labour demand decreases, and
so do wages.
For a non-trivial case with 0 < η < 1 the out-of-steady-state effects on wage
solution are not clear. These require extra attention and are left for future research.
The final extension of this paper would be to examine out-of-steady-state equi-
librium transition dynamics of the economy with wages based on surplus-sharing.
One may wonder how this paper relates to the research that focuses on the idea of
financially constrained firms borrowing from workers through decreasing their wages.
Perhaps the most well-known paper that exploits this idea is the one by Michelacci
and Quadrini (2009).6 In their model heterogeneous firms sign optimal long-term
wage contracts with workers which they hire in the competitive labour market. Each
firm starts with an amount of initial wealth which is not enough to pay for desired
capital investment. Thus, it borrows from external investors on a credit market
which is subject to frictions. These frictions result in the firm being financially
constrained. However, as it accumulates more and more wealth over time, its need
for external borrowing declines. At some point the credit constraint stops binding,
and the firm becomes unconstrained. In the described scenario firms prefer to pay
lower wages at the beginning of their life cycle, when they are small and constrained,
6Another paper which is related to this idea is the one by Wang (2015). The model in that paper
is based on a mechanism very similar to the one described in Michelacci and Quadrini (2009). For
empirical evidence of constrained firms borrowing from workers see, for example, Guiso et al. (2013)
who use the degree of development of financial markets in Italy to understand the role of firms as
internal credit markets.
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in exchange for higher wages later on, when they are large and unconstrained. Thus,
in this sense, firms borrow from workers by offering an increasing wage profile.
The work in this Chapter, and its future extensions, differs from Michelacci and
Quadrini (2009) along several dimensions. The model in this thesis characterises the
decisions of a representative firm that is always credit-constrained in steady state.
Wages are determined by splitting joint firm-worker surpluses which arise due to
the presence of search frictions in the labour market. In deterministic steady-state
environment the resulting wages are, in contrast to Michelacci and Quadrini (2009),
constant over time, there is no borrowing from workers in steady state. However,
these wages are different from wages that workers would receive if there were no
credit frictions. This allows me to compare these two wage functions as functions of
capital-to-labour ratios in this paper, and will allow me to compare them in steady-
state equilibrium in the future.
In my work, despite wages being constant in steady state, firms’ borrowing from
workers is possible out of steady state. This is because wages do depend on real-
izations of the productivity shock in my model. This is not only because the latter
affects workers’ productivity, but also because it affects firms’ net worth. Depending
on whether the shock today is good or bad wages adjust in some way. These wage
adjustments could potentially be interpreted as firms’ borrowing from workers.
In contrast, in Michelacci and Quadrini (2009) under optimal contracts and i.i.d.
shocks neither employment nor wages depend on productivity shocks. This happens
because firms are insured from bad shocks by risk-neutral investors. Firms may make
smaller debt payments in bad times and larger debt payments in good times. Hence,
Michelacci and Quadrini (2009) focus on steady-state transition of firm from being
constrained to being unconstrained. The change in wages comes from the variation
in firms’ life cycle in their paper. As opposed to this, I consider changes in wages that
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come from the variation in aggregate productivity. My focus is on constrained firms,
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Blanchard, O. and Gaĺı, J. (2010). Labor Markets and Monetary Policy: A New
Keynesian Model with Unemployment. American Economic Journal: Macroeco-
nomics, 2(2):1–30.
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(1 + µ(1− c̄))β(Aαkα−1l1−α − wk(k, l, A)l) = (1 + µ)
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Wage in steady state
w(k, l, A, µ) =
η(1 + µ(1− c̄))
1 + ηµ(1− c̄)
[




1 + ηµ(1− c̄)
.
(3.43)
1 +ηµ(1− c̄) = 1−
η(1− c̄)
[

























1 + ηµ(1− c̄)
=







































η(1 + µ(1− c̄))




















[(1− α)Akαl−α − wl(k, l, A)l + βcθ]

















Let w(k, l) = ω(κ), where κ = k
l
. Thus, wk(k, l)l = ω







[(1− α)Aκα + κω′(κ) + βcθ]

















B Parameter values for numerical example
The time period is taken to be equal to one week. I choose values for β, α, c̄, δk, δl
according to the calibration strategy in Chapter 2.
I set the value of β equal to the firm’s internal rate of return, β = 0.998, as in
Iacoviello (2005). I assume a conventional capital share of output, equal to 1/3. I
set the value of c̄, the minimum dividend share of gross profit, equal to 30% which is
a median of the dividend payout ratio (ratio of dividends paid to net income) across
S&P500 firms over the last 10 years.7 I choose capital depreciation rate to be equal
to 10% a year, or 0.19% a week. I set the value of the job destruction rate δl to be
equal to 0.0078, which is consistent with estimates in Shimer (2012).
I normalize the productivity level A equal to 1. The interest rate R is set to its
equilibrium rate equal to the inverse of the household’s discount factor, 0.999 as in
Iacoviello (2005).
To parameterize workers’ bargaining power η I calibrate the model with search
frictions only with wages determined by bargaining to match an elasticity of wages
to output per worker of 0.985, as in Pissarides (2009) . This results in η being around
0.4.
In Chapter 2 I calibrated the cost of opening a vacancy c to be equal to 29% of
wages. Here, I solve for wages as a function of capital-labour ratios. The resulting
wages range from 0.4 to 0.44 for κ in range from 0.06 to 0.15. I keep c to be equal
to around 29% of this wage range.
Hall and Milgrom (2008) suggest a calibration of the value of leisure u of around
70% of average labour productivity. In my model average labour productivity can
be written as Aκα, which changes for different values of κ. I set u equal to 0.4 which




Finally, to illustrate the point of wage ambiguity I set the value for labour market
tightness equal to 1.05 and the value for the price of capital to 380. These two
parameters are equilibrium objects. The two chosen values are not too far from
potential equilibrium values, as indicated by the calibration of the model with search
frictions only.
Table 3.6.1: Parameter values
Description Parameter Value
Firm’s discount factor β 0.998
Capital share α 1/3
Minimum dividend share c̄ 0.3
Job destruction rate δl 0.0078
Capital depreciation rate δk 0.002
Productivity level A 1
Interest rate R 1.00077
Vacancy cost c 0.1
Value of leisure u 0.4
Capital price q 380
Vacancy-unemployment ratio θ 1.05
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